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The thesis is the rhetorical development of a model of the utterance (principally) and 
of narrative (secondarily).  The utterance is treated as the basic unit of human be-ing 
and therefore the basic analytic unit for social science.  The starting motivation for the 
thesis is to provide a philosophical and methodological foundation upon which 
persons and people can be re-conceived in multiple and constructive renderings.  The 
thesis draws on the collective works of Mikhail Bakhtin to generate new diction with 
which to characterize the model.  First the model is stated, then six arguments to 
which the model is in answer are developed, finally the model is put into practice in 
nine analytics of data.  Data from 65 editions of ‘letters to the editor’ of the Daily 
News newspaper are used as prototypes to demonstrate prosaic intertexting as an 
analytic model.  Each letter to the editor is treated as representing a possible unit of 
the writer’s be-ing.  Prosaic intertexting is demonstrated in creating these ‘letters to 
the editor’ as data (utterances) as a unit of analysis for social science.  What is 
achieved is a model of how, not what, social science should do, though there are 






Chapter 1: Enter our dialogue 
 
Prosaic intertexting is both a model of how meaning(s) is/are, and a model by which social 
science can re-create things as variously meaningful.  In the limited space that is this 
dissertation I cannot (and will not attempt to) argue – in a philosophically convincing manner 
– that this model is the „real‟ or „correct‟ one.  Rather, I must only argue „what if it were so?‟, 
and rely on affirmation to „does this make sense to you?‟.  There are two reasons for me 
being limited in this way.  Firstly, I cannot do justice to the detailed and complex thought 
traditions that exist already – if I attempted to do so I would say nothing new.  Secondly, a 
central tenet of prosaic intertexting is that „reality‟/„correctness‟ are rhetorical and indefinite 
–  so pursing them through conventional „weighing of logical evidence‟, as in a philosophical 
debate, is not profitable.  In order to overcome this I take it for granted that all of the thesis is 
answerable – and therefore referent to – chapter 3.  I place this disclaimer at the start of the 
thesis to mollify readers if the crassness of my handling of a given thought-school is 
offensive.  I also put it here to encourage readers to approach prosaic intertexting, to 
comprehend it, as if it were „true‟, all true, and not be stymied by immediate objections. 
 
Prosaic intertexting goes to the heart of personhood (and its study; social science) by asking 
„What is happening here?‟  A most bald and true answer in this case is that „words are being 
read‟.  That seems somewhat dry, so let us try again: „What does „what is happening‟ mean‟?  
Well, it depends, what are we going to say it means?  How perspicacious of us.  Prosaic 
intertexting is a model by which the meaning of an event can be created – whether in a 
retrospective, analytic sense, or in a prospective, prosaic sense.  Prosaic intertexting is a 
picture of how we create things to have meaning as we say them to have.  Since meaning 
creating is definitive of human be-ing (an active process), prosaic intertexting is also a model 
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of personhood.  Smagorinsky (2001) has applied a similar philosophy to the one outlined in 
this research to an exploration of priority of culture to facilitate protocol analysis.  Prosaic 
intertexting is much more fundamental in that it is an attempt to provide a starting point to 
social science in general, not just protocol analysis.  This „fundamentality‟ means prosaic 
intertexting has many implications and will therefore be described multiply in this 
dissertation. 
 
Prosaic intertexting differs from both lay and scientific models of being.  Some of this 
difference is to be outlined in chapter 2.  Historically the models of human be-ing used in 
social science are based either on the self as the rational thinker (see Hume, 1737), the self as 
a conditioned responder (see Skinner, 1980), or the self as a cultural artefact (see Mead, 
2001).  Clearly this is not an exhaustive list, but it serves to make this point: Prosaic 
intertexting is none of these things.  Prosaic intertexting is an attempt to do for the social 
science methodology of self and meaning creating on a micro-level, what Chomsky (see 
Chomsky, 1987; Chomsky & Pateman, 2005; Chompsky, Ronat & Viertel, 1979; Chomsky, 
van Buren & Allen, 1971) does for the ethicopolitics of self, self-determination and group 
meaning sanction and dismissal.   
 
A distinct point about prosaic intertexting is that it operates from the assumption that an act is 
inseparable from its meaning.  This is because all acts are only social/human acts by virtue of 
their meaning.  In this sense prosaic intertexting is a formulation of embodied and 
interpersonal meaning-creating.  Prosaic intertexting is in answer to many lines of thought 
(some of which are outlined in chapter 3), and the real uniqueness about the model is its 
ability to accommodate superficially discordant ideas – for example that things cannot have a 
„true‟ meaning, but that a thing has a specific meaning.  However, my comment on how 
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prosaic intertexting is different from other models is as much a statement of categorical 
difference as it is an argument for why you and I should invest in exploring its possibilities.  
In short, what does prosaic intertexting offer that is new?  Prosaic intertexting allows 
ontological relativism to escape infinite meaning-subjectivity by outlining a process for 
meaning-creation inter-subjectively.  Prosaic intertexting is an attempt to do for social 
science what a model of the atom did for physics.  It gives social scientists the opportunity to 
engage with the human world of meaning with a new exploratory tool.  Although I specify 
some possible applications in chapters 3 and 4 these are simply examples to frame prosaic 
intertexting for the reader.  The focus of this dissertation is to provide an initial starting point 
to which further work can expand on the application of prosaic intertexting in other settings. 
 
There are three specific problems that this research aims to address.  Firstly, can a model of 
the utterance with ontologically relativist assumptions, have face validity?  Secondly, does 
this model of the utterance also accurately model the self-in-be-ing as it should in theory?  
Thirdly, is this model of self applicable in such a way that it adds value and possibilities to 
social science?  The research is exploratory in the sense that it is a first attempt into a 
bringing ideas together into a work-able model.   
 
Why is it important to meet these objectives?  I argue that existing models of be-ing are 
disparately successful in modelling only parts of the complexity of human be-ing.  Often 
models of be-ing appear at a dis-juncture to each other, but if the philosophical divide that 
stretches between them could be bridged then a greater completeness of human be-ing would 
be mapped.  The existing models of be-ing are either static or unarticulated.  This leads to 
social research that neither captures the complexity of social living, nor the possibility for 
creation and re-creation in novel ways that characterises adaptive social living.  If the 
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research cannot meet the second aim then it is incongruent with its philosophical origins, and 
if it cannot meet the third aim then it is no different from the conventional social science it 
claims to differ from.  Further examples of the function of the research will be outlined in 
chapter 2, and a specific application of prosaic intertexting is the substance for chapter 4. 
 
This thesis is an act of social science.  In it, I argue that social science needs to be done 
differently.  I argue that traditional social science operates on a false split between „what is 
being studied‟, and „how it is known to be that‟.  This thesis argues that ontology, 
epistemology and methodology are best considered together.  I furthermore argue that social 
science is a study of human be-ing, but that human be-ing is a time extended process of 
meaning created acts.  In consequence, I advance an alternative methodology for rendering 
the meaning creation of acts intelligible.  This methodology takes the form of a model of 
utterance.  If this model of utterance is to social science what an atom is to physics, then 
implications of accepting this model to social science is what Einstein‟s relativity theory was 
to Newtonian physics. 
 
In order to avoid being hypocritical I have to create this dissertation alternatively to 
conventional dissertations.  This chapter (chapter 1) is a definition of the 
answerability/addressivity (a/a) complex that focuses the thesis as a whole – consider chapter 
1 the introduction.  Chapter 2 is the explicit speech-act I am making with regard to meaning 
creation in the social sciences – consider it as a definition of the data.  Chapter 3 is a 
collection of six answerings – consider it as the literature review.  Chapter 4 is nine 
addressings – consider it as the analysis section.  Chapter 5 is what is written on the packet of 
this meaning seed – consider it as the discussion section.  The arrangement of the thesis is 
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presented diagrammatically in Figure 1.  If chapter 2 is our „data‟, a definition of what is, 
then the other chapters are a rhetorical creation of how that data can be meaningful. 
Figure 1. The thesis. 
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This is not a conventional thesis though.  These are not merely aesthetic name-changes in 
order for me to appear clever.  The thesis advertently challenges some of the norms of 
academic research and reporting.  This is not a simply rebellious act.  Rather it is to highlight 
the developmental, innovative aspirations for social science that is a primary pillar of the 
thesis.  This thesis is about finding new diction with which to move about in the field of 
human be-ing.  It is about asking and answering questions – with new eyes, hands, mouths, 
ears, tongues and brains – on „what is happening when humans be?‟ and „what does human 
be-ing(s) mean?‟.  A new answer to „what does social science mean?‟ should be accompanied 
by a new question on how „what is happening here‟ is social scientific?  The tone of this 
introduction is as it is as an attempt to establish a new genre we can talk through.  The 
success of this is left as an open question as part of the utterance that is this thesis.   
 
The thesis assumes a relativist ontology and a rhetorical ideology for social science.  The 
dissertation will not include explicit de-bunking of any „conventional‟ social science, rather it 
is a positive statement of social science created in an alternative way.  I assume implicit value 
in any new rendering of social science by virtue of the fact that it may give us greater 
capacity/more diction with which to do the work of social science.  The dissertation is only a 
masters level work.  Space is therefore constrained, and the work-around I have chosen for 
this is to ask the reader to explore the text as if it were meaningful/sensible/„true‟.  This is not 
simply a convenient strategy though, treating an utterance (for example this dissertation) as if 
it makes sense is integral to rendering it intelligible.  The dissertation will fail if the reader 
experiences no novelty in it.  While the validity of the proposed model is yet to be explored 
and verified, the face value of the model must be established with the reader.  The 
dissertation is a positing of a possibility, the re-rendering of this possibility as established and 
not conjectural is beyond this work.  
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Chapter 2: Prosaic intertexting – the method 
 
Prosaic intertexting is a social scientific method.  Chapter 2 is the space in which the method 
is stated.  The analogy for prosaic intertexting is that a meaning is a tree.  This tree is in 
dialogue with the „earth‟ (historical speech-act possibilities) and the „air‟ (consequential 
speech-act possibilities).  By the same analogy, meaning (an extended set of singular 
meanings) is a forest in a ball, as possible meaning trees overlay each other in multiple 
dimensions.  The model stated here is incomplete – and cannot be intelligible as an utterance 
in the living moment of its creation – without its histories, in chapter 3, and its consequential 
possibilities, in chapter 4.  Prosaic intertexing is both a model of human be-ing and a model 
by which to render human be-ing intelligible.  Why prosaic intertexting?  „Prosaic‟, because it 
privileges the everyday, the non-poetic, base acts of persons and not the „form‟, the art or the 
heroically definitive.  „Intertexting‟, because it imposes voice arbiters into „possible texts‟ or 
between two spheres of contestation among utterances-in-potentia.   
 
Prosaic intertexting is an act of utterance creation.  An utterance is a unit of meaning.  An 
utterance is any act that is rendered intelligible as a communication, whether by the „utterer‟ 
or by the „hearer/s‟.  Utterances are directed, they are intentional; they are both in answer to 
other utterances and they demand answerability from other utterances.  These other 
utterances, in both answering and demanding answerability, may be real or perceived 
previous utterances or possible contemporary/future utterances.  Utterances are defined by 
their wholeness in relation to other utterances.  They are bounded by the space they fill in a 
„dialogue‟.  The utterance is not defined by its internal elements.  For example, the same set 
of words, a sentence perhaps, will be many different utterances when „spoken‟/„heard‟ in 
different dialogue contexts.  These utterances are as distinct as if the words were completely 
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changed.  This thesis is an utterance.  It is a unit for conveying my meaning on the „reality‟ of 
human be-ing.  So, how is this unit created?  Prosaic intertexting is the method of creating 
utterances. 
 
Firstly, what is the distinction between an „utterance‟ and what is transcribed as conventional 
social scientific data?  In prosaic intertexting a distinction is made between utterances and 
explicit speech-acts.  Utterances are (a) whole, (b) only producible (not reproducible) and (c) 
in a „living moment of being‟.  Explicit speech-acts, or speech/acts, or speech:acts, are all that 
is perceptibly (through the five primary senses and not prosaic intertexting) part of a given 
event (as defined by the social scientist).  For example, the motion and sound and smell/taste 
of a dancer‟s body, or the sound/transcription of an interviewee talking.  Figure 2 illustrates 
the lonely space that explicit speech-acts occupy in utterance creation.  The vertical line is 
chosen because it, by itself, appears meaningless – it is what we will create around the line 
that will make the picture/utterance.   
 




Explicit speech-acts are what are available to the conventional social scientist as data.  For 
example, a quote from an open-ended interview.  With prosaic intertexting the explicit 
speech-act is the „trunk‟ from which the social scientist must create a meaning tree/utterance.  
The process of creation is outlined in this chapter, and Figure 2 is but a starting point.  The 
utterance is the prosaic intertexting social scientist‟s created data, not the explicit speech-act.  
The utterance is created as a moment in the social scientist‟s rhetorical narrative. 
 
Secondly, trees do not grow in empty spaces; they grow in an environment.  The space that a 
tree (and a meaning) grows in is contested by other trees.  No meaning can be created that is 
not contested, non-rhetorical (see Billig, 1996; Billig, Gane, Condor, Middleton & Edwards, 
1988).  Creating a meaning tree (an utterance) is akin to shifting to a particular focus through 
which the utterance is intelligible.  This „focusing‟ is a choice by the social scientist.  The 
conventional social scientist argues for a particular interpretation of the „the facts‟, calling on 
specific data to support this interpretation.  The conventional social scientist though is 
intractably driven by a particular research question that does – even if this is denied – frame 
the interpretation of the data.  For example, a strictly trained anthropologist with heavy 
„participatory research‟ inclinations enters a community and requests them to use her skills to 
their benefit.  This research will still be doubly framed.  First, by the social scientist – as an 
act of facilitating „community‟ agency and voice, and second by the community – as they 
define what they want to know.  The answerability/addressivity (a/a) complex is the 
imposition of a frame in which to render an explicit speech-act intelligible as an utterance.  
This is represented in Figure 3 by a circular „biosphere‟ within which the meaning tree will 
be grown.  I choose a circle as it is naturally neutral and any point on the edge is equidistant 




Figure 3. The answerability/addressivity complex. 
„circle‟ should be a multi-dimensional space where multitudinous possible meaning trees  
over-lay each other.  The a/a complex is also a conscious act by the social scientist that is part 
of the intelligibility rendering.  The act of creating an a/a complex is contested, when it is 
proposed (for funding or to colleagues), when it is imposed (in the social scientist‟s 
deliberations/analysis), and when it is produced (in a journal submission or presentation).  
The a/a complex is a first step in intelligibility rendering.  By creating an a/a complex as an 
explicit part of the social scientific process, the results are more accessible to challenge and 
therefore more useful/valid.   
 
Thirdly, the a/a complex is divisible into two hemispheres, as in Figure 4.  This division is 
not real, but a rhetorical device for meaning creating by imposing chronospace on explicit 
speech-acts.  Chronospatial contextualizing is an act of arranging events in space and time.  
This act is rhetorical because the arrangement of events in a particular way serves a particular 
rendering of intelligibility.  For example, chronospatial contextualization is the difference 
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between „seeing a person and shooting a gun‟ and „shooting a gun and (then) seeing a 
person‟.   
  
Figure 4. Chronospatial division of the a/a complex. 
 
Above I argued that the a/a complex is a contested space.  In Figure 5 the rhetorical  
 
Figure 5. Coloured chronospatial division of the a/a complex. 
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chronospatial divider separates that space into „earth‟ – darker grey area – and „air‟ – lighter 
grey area.  The „earth‟ is a space full of historical „logical precedings‟ to the explicit speech 
act.  The „air‟ is a space full of consequential possibilities of the speech-act if it is accepted as 
rhetorically intended – including further applications, appropriations and objections.  Both 
the „earth‟ and „air‟ are fictive, in potential elements, imposed by the intelligibility renderer 
with the rhetorical aims.  The „earth‟ may seem more solid (the past seems more easily 
corroborated than the future is now), and the „air‟ may seem to be bigger or have more 
potential (because the future is so indeterminate now that anything is possible).  However, 
both the „earth‟ and „air‟ are fictive and are full of potential because they exist, not as truths 
that may be corroborated, but only as rhetorical elements of the rendering of the explicit 
speech-act as an utterance. 
 
Fourthly, the amorphous mush of the „earth‟ is given voices to exemplify it.  Just as tree roots 
push into the earth, so too „answerings‟ push into the „earth-history‟ of an utterance, as with 
„c‟, „d‟, „e‟ and „f‟ in Figure 6.  The explicit speech-act is in answer to these „answerings‟.   
 
Figure 6. Answerings. 
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The answerings are pseudo speech-acts that are created as explicit by the social scientist – the 
„essays‟ in chapter 3 are created as answerings to this thesis.  The answerings are tied to the 
explicit speech-act when it is manifested as an utterance.  The number and nature of the 
answerings is dependent on the intelligibility renderer (social scientist) and their rhetoric.  
The answerings are not „real‟ – in the sense that they need to have been explicitly voiced by a 
person – but at the same time the explicit speech-act is unintelligible (not an utterance) 
without them.  In the contested earth-space, where possible, heteroglossic voices contest to be 
answered by an explicit speech-act, the answerings are fictional voices by which the prosaic 
intertexter exerts rhetorical force to a particular intelligibility rendering.  Each answering has 
a voice imposed on it such that each answering becomes the fictive ventriloque of a speech 
genre.  To represent this in prosaic intertexting methodology, each „voice‟ is explicitly 
labelled with a genre archetype/prosopopoeia.  For example, in order to impose a rhetoric of 
the explicit speech-act being motivated by person X‟s personal interests, the prosopopoeia 
„person X‟s altruism‟ may be imposed as an answering voice.  This is not a direct quote from 
„real‟ history, but rather an imposed and fictional quote from a rhetorical earth-history. 
 
Fifthly, the tree has roots but it still needs branches.  Just as the „earth‟ is given voice, so too 
the ethereal openness of „air‟ is given prosopopoeial voices, as in „addressings‟ „h‟, „i‟, „j‟ 
and „k‟ in Figure 7.  All utterances are addressive, they call other utterances to respond to 
them.  This addressivity is not a function of the explicit speech-act being a question or not.  
Rather, addressivity is a function of the utterance‟s attempt to impose meaning.  Speech-acts 
have form and implications determined by long traditions of social consensus.  These forms 
make particular answerings seem to „flow‟ more easily.  For example, two people meet and 
one person extends her hand towards the other.  This is addressive of her hand being taken in-




Figure 7. Addressings. 
her hand, pulling her towards him and embracing her‟ without adding special and additional 
circumstances – he recognizes her as long-lost pre-school friend for instance.  Addressings 
are imposed genre archetypes through which an explicit speech-act is rendered intelligible.  
Addressings are not real, but without them an explicit speech act is unintelligible.  It is the 
social scientist‟s task to create and explicate addressings such that the explicit speech-act may 
be scrutinized as a meaningful utterance.  As part of this task the addressings are also 
ascribed fictive voice-names to further ventriloque/give prosopopoeia to a speech genre.  For 
example „the pope‟ voice-name may be imposed to ventriloque catholic morals.  
Alternatively Rocky Balboa could be imposed as a genre archetype of „bull-headedness 
leading to success‟.  The addressings are clearly not quotes of either the pope or Rocky 
though.  The same process of imposing voice-naming is used for creating answerings. 
 
Finally, Figure 8 is an utterance.  The utterance is whole, produced in its moment of being by 
a rhetorically motivated social scientist.  The utterance is more than what is explicit.  The aim 




Figure 8. An utterance. 
When Shweder (1990) and Shweder and Sullivan (1993) talk of „intentional worlds‟ they are 
talking of human worlds where meaning imposition is the act of be-ing.  The utterance is the 
unit in which acts of be-ing occur, not explicit speech-acts.  An utterance is like a particular 
time-dimensional part of music, while an explicit speech-act is just a note.  The note has a 
sound, but it is un-interesting.  What is interesting is the piece of music, with its melody, 
harmonies and overtones.  The length of this „part of music‟ is determined by how long it is 
listened to. 
 
So that is an utterance, a unit of meaning-creating, but the analysis of a single utterance is not 
always the most interesting to the social scientist.  Rather, social science is often interested in 
how multiple utterances relate (or not).  To continue the music analogy, multiple utterances, 
combined, is a song.  But, the song has multiple possible renditions/renderings of 
intelligibility.  How does the social scientist legitimately construct a particular set of 




Firstly, one person‟s answering/addressing is another person‟s utterance.  What was 
„Addressing H‟ in Figures 7 and 8, above, can easily be „Utterance H‟ if it is made explicit 
and rendered intelligible though prosaic intertexting as shown in Figure 9.  Furthermore, the  
 
Figure 9. Another utterance. 
answerings and addressings rhetorically created by the social scientist in the process of 
rendering an explicit speech-act as an intelligible utterance are not the only possible 
answerings and addressings.  Both hemispheres of the a/a complex are spaces of contestation 
where innumerable possible answerings and addressings are suppressed by the centripetal 
forces of speech genres and language (see chapter 3).  Indeed, each of the possible 
(suppressed or expressed) answerings/addressings in an a/a complex can be rendered as an 
utterance.  By introducing something new, and if enough rhetorical force is applied, the focus 
of the a/a complex may be shifted (or rather: Re-created in a different place) to allow for 
what was an answering/addressing to be rendered as an utterance.  For example, an extremist 
apartheid adherent has feelings of love-attraction for a member of another race.  These 
feelings are un-utterable with the a/a complex of „divine-destined racial separation‟.  But the 
feelings persist, grow stronger.  The person converts to a different religion and „discovers‟ 
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that the expression of inter-racial love is intelligible.  The suppressed addressing becomes an 
utterance.  This utterance is intelligible only insofar as it is complete with its own 
answerability complex, as well as new answerings and addressings for it. 
 
Secondly, the construction of a narrative is an active process of rendering a set of utterances 
as intelligible in serial.  Figure 10 illustrates a facile example of the multiple narrative lines 
that may be strung together our of explicated utterances.  „4‟ is the original explicit speech-
act.  Follow any line from thinnest to thickest and back to thinnest (for example from „1‟ to 
„2‟ to „3‟ to „4‟ to „5‟ to „6‟ to „7‟ in Figure 10) and a „narrative‟ of seven explicit speech-acts 
is created.   
Figure 10. The infinity of meaning and human be-ing. 
Narratives are rarely this simple by virtue of natural „language‟ processes – centripetal and 
centrifugal forces.  Rather, the narrative must be created as simple/self-evident/sensible in 










utterance long narratives in Figure 10.  Consider that for each of these 183 start points there 
are at least 91 end points.  16653 possible 7-utterance long narratives.  And that is only 
because I only created-as-explicit an average number of 7 answerings plus addressings per 
explicit speech-act.  There are billions; actually, there are an infinite number as no utterances 
could ever be exactly the same as another.  There are also innumerable potential narratives of 
a different length than 7 utterances.  There are three things prosaic intertexting social 
scientists should be very grateful for: (1) the centripetal forces of language, (2) the lack of 
true discernment exercised by audiences in accepting examples as representative of huge 
numbers of answerings and addressings, and (3) that prosaic intertexting is how persons be 
and thus every audience is good at it.  All three of these points diminish the actual number of 
narratives that the social scientist must engage with/in our rhetorical creation of truths 
through intelligibility renderings/utterance creation.  The generative capacity of prosaic 
intertexting is also neatly illustrated in Figure 10 in that, for each explicit speech-act there are 
multiple „next‟ points in narrative creation.  All explicit speech-acts can be re-rendered as 
new utterances and a narrative can be equivocated by a presumably archetypal utterances. 
 
Chapter 2 has been an illustration of what prosaic intertexting as a social scientific 
methodology is.  Chapter 2 is only an explicit speech-act, it is not an utterance.  While, if read 
independently from the dissertation, you (as a human be-ing) will be able to render it 
intelligible, you will impose an a/a complex on it.  You will therefore not render it intelligible 
as I have intended it to be.  Please do not do this.  Rather, accept that chapter 2 is 
unintelligible for now.  To do some more rhetorical work with you (after that pleading): The 
analogy of a meaning tree is stretched at best, it is not worthwhile you trying to squeeze 
meaning out of it when I have provided meaning elsewhere.  Cajoling?  Irritating?  Maybe, 
but that is what we do, up to now we have hidden behind the „science‟. 
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Chapter 3: Intertextual voices to the meaning proposition of the thesis 
 
Where am I getting this model from?  What is its earth?  The essays in this chapter (3) are the 
dialogic threads upon which dangle my utterances.  The essays are answerings to the explicit 
speech-act of chapter 2, they are addressive of the thesis, and chapter 2 is in answer to these 
essays.  The essays are attempts to achieve something for the thesis: validity.  The essays are 
six origin points such that prosaic intertexting can be created as a sensible meeting point to 
them, together.  The essays are best read as if in parallel, not in sequence (though we are 
limited by the medium of a dissertation in this regard).  What links the essays is not a 
traditional narrative, with a beginning and end, but rather that they all flow into chapter 2 
(with different foci).  The purpose of the essays is, always, to create prosaic intertexting as 
valid, sensible and valuable. 
 
What is new with prosaic intertexting? 
 
Prosaic intertexting is not the first model of human be-ing, though (in my definition) many 
other models are not explicitly called this.  We all have a sense of what it means to be a 
person – and in that sense an informal model of human be-ing.  This essay will sketch and 
critique three existing models of human be-ing: the „Cartesian thinker‟, the „self in society‟, 
and the „African staged process‟.  Prosaic intertexting is argued to draw on each of these 
models in creating a new and better one.  The two purposes of this essay are (1) to 
demonstrate prosaic intertexting as a revolution and a refinement, and (2) to give readers an 
intellectual „in‟ into what prosaic intertexting is and how it relates to already established 




„The conciliatory and reasonable intellectual guide‟: I cannot explicate all models of human 
be-ing in this thesis.  Rather, I am creating three „statements‟ of human be-ing to represent 
three prominent conceptual trends.  The primary purpose of these creations is to illustrate 
how prosaic intertexting is novel, not to summarise intellectual trends. 
 
Model 1 – Cogito ergo sum (c.f. Descartes, 1644), I think therefore I am.  What I am is a 
thinking being.  A human being is a thing that perceives, cognates and acts on this rationality.  
A person is one thing, a whole and, at essence, unchanging except for its natural development 
toward actualization.  The person is bounded by its unique position that it occupies in space 
and relative to others.  A person is a thing in and of itself.  The essence of a person is 
disguised under layers of confounding factors – for example Bronfenbrenner‟s (1979) 
„ecological‟ model of self.  This model of human be-ing is pervasive in many forms of 
rationalism (see Leibniz, 1764; c.f. Wolff, 1734), cognitivism (see American Psychocological 
Association, 2000; Broadbent, 1958; Koffka, 1924; Kohler, 1967) and often religious 
thinking in the form of a „soul‟ or „divine essence‟ (see Johnson, Kundakunda & 
Kundakunda, 1995; Pope John Paul II, 1997; Taherzadeh, 1976).  The purpose of the person 
is often defined by shrugging off of confounding variables and being as „true‟ to the „real‟ 
person they are „underneath it all‟ (see self-actualization in Maslow, 1943; 1962).  With this 
model the purposes of social science are (a) to understand the relationship between the „true‟ 
self and the „self as it appears‟, and (b) to find ways to „condition‟ true selfs to act in ways we 
want them to.  The self is finalized, it is individual and we must define it.   
 
Prosaic intertexting differs fundamentally from this model of human be-ing.  A person has to 
be created as one thing, it can only be whole if its proposition is consummated by other 
persons and has no „natural‟ development as its „meaning‟ is rhetoric specific.  A person is 
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unbounded and full of potential „persons‟ until it is actively bounded in a rhetorical 
invocation.  The person has no „purpose‟ – purposes are also rhetorical invocations – but 
creating it with purpose is necessary to its continuance to be an active social meaning creator.  
The purpose for social science is to define ways for persons to be in ways that social 
scientists wish them to. 
 
Model 2 – A person is by virtue of their implications (Dewey, 1922; James, 1911; Pierce, 
1897).  All persons‟ implications are inevitably social.  So, a person is by virtue of social 
implications.  But, society exists on a higher plane than the persons in it (Durkheim, 1950).  
Persons are arbiters of social categories/stereotypes.  Persons act as social arbiters by 
accessing social scripts, playing the socially defined game of norms (see Bicchieri, Jeffrey & 
Skyrms, 1999).  A person is real, but completely dependent on the social context that they are 
in to interact with other people.  Persons learn to be social beings by internalizing interactions 
from the inter-personal to the intra-personal plane (Vygotsky, 1964; 1978; Wertsch, 1985; 
1986; 1991; 1998; 2002; Wertsch, del Rio & Alvarez, 1995).  Shotter (1993) argues that in 
the process of internalization something new must be created and that this something is of the 
self.  This model of human be-ing is pervasive in cultural psychology (see Bruner, 1990; 
Shweder, 1991; Triandis, 1989), sociology (see Nisbet, 1967; Willis, 1996) and positioning 
theory (see Harre, 1979; Harre & van Langenhove, 1999).  The purpose of the self is to fulfill 
their function as an instantiation of the society they belong to.  The purposes of social science 
are (a) to understand how society creates persons as it does, and (b) to discover how to 
modify society to serve a particular interest.  The self exists only as a rhetorical concept that 




Prosaic intertexting differs in degree from this model of human be-ing.  A person is indebted 
to the social to consummate meanings-created, but society is only a tool in the rhetorical 
creation of meaning.  Social scientists create persons as instantiations of social categories not 
because they are so, but because doing so enables the social scientist to say something about 
how groups of people inter-relate.  A person has no „purpose‟, but neither does a social 
category – except insofar it is created as having particular purpose by the social scientist.  
The purpose of social science is to create new ways for persons to talk about social 
arrangements. 
 
Model 3 – A person travels through the cosmos on a staged journey of self-becoming.  
Personhood is a cycle of moving from one life stage to another.  The person is a special 
being, born into this plane and on a journey of transcending to the next.  A person‟s life-stage 
is independent of their chronological age.  A person on one life-stage is qualitatively 
different, but in unity with, the person they are when in another life-stage.  Death is a 
transcending of this plane but a continuation of the person into another.  Persons become by 
undergoing certain social rituals and trials.  Moving to a subsequent life-stage is dependent 
on social process and sanction.  A person is defined by the life journey they have been born 
into and how well they are able to follow that journey in the social group they are in and the 
social group is dependent on its members for definition (for the ethical implications of this 
see Mutowo, 2001; Ramose, 1999).  This model of human be-ing is pervasive in many 
Nguni-culture groups in sub-Saharan Africa (Mkhize, 2004).  The purpose of human be-ing is 
to fulfil the function of the person‟s current life-stage as well as possible in the eyes of their 
social group so that the person may progress to a subsequent life-stage.  The purposes of 
social science are (a) to understand the particular demands of each life-stage relative to the 
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journey as a whole, and (b) to facilitate the specific objectives of human be-ing.  Be-ing is 
active and it is a process.  The self exists as it is currently embodied. 
 
Prosaic intertexting differs in focus from this model of human be-ing.  The person is 
fundamentally social and individual at the same time.  The person is unique in their position 
among others, but only others can consummate their meaning.  Personhood is not a stage-like 
process though; stages are rhetorical and heuristic tools for social scientists.  In prosaic 
intertexting a person is to be considered in the living-moment of their be-ing.  The purpose of 
social science is to create new ways for the person to be relative to the social context by re-
creating acts as instantiations of the process of personhood. 
 
This essay illustrates the space prosaic intertexting occupies relative to three other models of 
be-ing.  The purpose of the essay is for you to see prosaic intertexting as a development on 
earlier, established social scientific ideas, but also as a creative and necessary departure.  The 
task for the reader is to explicate and consider the model of human be-ing that you hold to.  
How is prosaic intertexting different from that?  What assumptions of yours does it 
challenge?  And what potentials does it hold for creating human be-ing in ways you have not 
yet thought possible? 
 
What is the point of prosaic intertexting? 
 
Why do prosaic intertexting, it sounds all conceptually complicated and intellectually 
sophisticated, but at the end of the day, what do we use it for?  The purpose of this essay is to 
outline three of the potential practical uses for prosaic intertexting – identity 
creation/enactment/maintenance and trauma resolution, reconciliation and stereotype 
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dissolution.  All three of these uses stem from the prosaic intertexting argument that meaning 
is not fixed but must be created.  Prosaic intertexting gives social scientists a tool to re-create 
meaning so that it is better for the parties concerned.  This re-creation is not an instant-fix 
medical cure, but rather a potent weapon in the social scientist‟s rhetorical armament.  The 
purpose of this essay is to illustrate prosaic intertexting not as simply the brainchild of a 
masters student trying to demonstrate cleverness.  Rather, prosaic intertexting is an applied, 
„prosaic‟ tool that is practical to everyday meaning creating. 
 
The do-gooder looking for ways to change the world: As persons, we would benefit greatly 
from an ability to change our realities.  „Reality‟ (as it is self/socially imposed as true) is 
often not a very nice or constructive chronospace.  „Reality‟ is an everyday, personal 
wrestling partner for persons.  „Reality‟ is an ideological battleground of „truth‟ and „right‟ 
between persons.  „Reality‟ is an uninformed, default-state legitimator of taken-for-granted 
positions toward other persons.  „Reality‟ is where identities are enacted and maintained.  
„Reality‟ gives us footing in conflicting with others.  „Reality‟ is where stereotype 
consequences are inevitable.  But „reality‟ is not real, is not inevitable, is not essential; rather 
it is created.   
 
In the first instance, the ontology of prosaic intertexting is beneficial for identity 
creation/enactment/maintenance and personal trauma resolution.  Philosophical self-
awareness/sentience is a defining feature of humanity.  Psychologically it is self-differention 
from others that marks the development of an infant into a person (see Erikson, 1968; 
Inhelder & Piaget, 1958).  Human be-ing is a process of self-utterances and the self-
utterances that are possible at any moment of be-ing are socially negotiated.  All cultures are 
defined by the potential-utterances that are coherent to members of that culture.  Cultures 
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change over time through changes in this pool of coherent-utterance-potential.  All persons, 
as selves-in-utterances in a culture, are Foucauldian (see Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982) 
operatives in both sustaining these cultures and in regulating their acts in accordance with it.  
Persons may feel guilty when the self they have enacted is in discordance with the 
„morals/mores‟ of „their‟ culture, or, indignant at a transgression of these „morals/mores‟ by 
an outsider self.  Prosaic intertexting is a tool to give persons (a) greater scope to create new 
identity-acts for themselves and others within their culture, and (b) to give new meaning to 
self-acts by re-appraising its culture-utteree. 
 
The very component parts of our identity-created are malleable.  To ask a person who they 
are, is to ask for them to recall the special set of event-memories that has brought them to be 
as they are now.  Whether it is a teen explaining to their parents how their friends were 
„egging-on‟ as they hung-around at home and how this led to them being the driver of the, 
recently dented, family car, or a presidential hopeful narrating the challenges of their early 
life that prepared them to make the tough decisions associated with the post.  What ties these 
two examples is a reliance on memory to construct a plausible story that legitimates the 
utterer‟s current self-act.  This is equally true when we make sense of another‟s acts; the 
other is couched as a particular „self‟ that makes a singular contemporary act by that self 
intelligible to us.  This particular version of self is substantiated and made plausible by 
recalling – or inventing (see below) – prior self-acts.  For example, when your parent scolds 
you it is done as an act of constructive criticism and love by contextualizing it in instances of 
them supporting your development, including recent praise.  Even when couching the „self‟ 
as motivated to future aims these aims are rendered intelligible to us by inserting them in a 
history of self-acts that is plausible to us in our cultural semantic-complex of what it means to 
be a person – a person that is whole, it has beliefs and desires, and acts for most part 
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coherently.  “As Neisser (1967) argued decades ago, memory is not so much a matter of 
„reappearance‟ as it is a matter of active construction based on traces from earlier 
experiences” (Wertsch, 2002, p. 8).  Memory, the tool used to contextualize „self‟ in a history 
of self-acts, is constructive, not reality-reflective.  Even when we can have no memory of a 
person, in the case of a stranger, we are still be able to invent histories for their self-acts.  As 
soon as new characters appear in our favourite TV drama we begin to construct stories that 
make sense of their acts, or rather, make their acts sensible to us.   
 
Memory is also an act-of-the-self-in-others, and this is a vital constituent of be-ing.  As 
Wertsch (2002, p. 6) argues, “Memory… is viewed as „distributed‟ between agent and texts, 
and the task becomes one of listening for the texts and the voices behind them as well as the 
voices of the particular individuals using these texts in particular settings… we are asking 
about the general perspective, or „speaking consciousness‟ that Bakhtin (1981) defined as 
„voice‟”.  The „voice‟ is a heuristic used to bind a string of utterances in the same way „self‟ 
binds a string of event-acts, making them coherent, causative and intelligible as legitimate 
addressees.  What is key is the integral value of others-other-than self in rendering all acts 
intelligible.  This is expressed in the isiZulu maxim of „umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu‟ or, a 
person is a person through persons.  Harré (1979) furthermore highlights the positional nature 
of personal meaning making.  „Who‟, which „voice‟, an act/utterance is addressed toward 
changes the meaning of the act/utterance.  Having a book published under your name is less 
glorious and more taken-for-granted when meaning-addressed to your peers in academia than 
when meaning-addressed to your family of shoemakers.  Fundamentally then, identity is an 
act of social-construction – not just in the loose sense of the post-modern zeitgeist where „all 
things are constructed‟ – but rather in the strong sense that meaning is created iteratively, 
instant-by-instant, prosaically.   
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Prosaic intertexting is this process of meaning creating, evaluating and re-addressing each 
act/utterance in the context of social texts.  By interrogating the meaning-assumed, and by 
changing the social text into which the act/utterances is interred, persons have flexibility in 
constructing self-identities.  This is the aim of narrative therapy (Payne, 2000; Shawver & 
Dokecki, 1970; White, 1990); to have the story told by the person (not a patient as the 
meanings associated with patient are not necessarily helpful to the „person‟) re-told, 
facilitating their re-telling of it in a „health-positive‟ way.  Payne (2000) includes „using 
externalizing language‟, „relative influence questioning‟, „deconstruction of unique 
outcomes‟, „inviting the person to take a position‟ and „re-membering‟ as therapeutic 
methods to re-tell a problem-saturated self-narrative as self-positive.  Cognitive behavioural 
therapy operates through a similar mechanism of procedurally testing the „faulty‟ thinking of 
persons with regard to other versions of „reality‟ (see Beck & Haaga, 1992; Beck & 
Weishaar, 1995; Curwen, Palmer & Ruddell, 2000; Wilson, 1995).  Cognitive-behavioural 
therapy though is realist, this rigid search for the singular truth is limiting to self-construction 
in a complex intentional world.  Narrative therapy on the other hand has foundations in post-
modern/non-realist philosophy (Hermans & Hermans-Jansen, 1995; Hoyt, 1996; Hoyt, 1998; 
Shawer, 2000).  What it lacks is an adequate model of how relativist meaning creating 
operates on a prosaic level to sustain the intentional worlds of human be-ing.  Narrative 
therapy (and a re-phrased, post-modern cognitive-behavioural therapy) highlight how prosaic 
intertexting may be harnessed to improve life for persons; persons are better able to cope 
with, and capitalize on, the unpredictability of life by reframing what things mean.  For 
example young white South Africans who are not offered immediate employment in a labour 
market of affirmative action may frame this as an opportunity to use the privilege that being 
white often entails (such as access to better education) to extend themselves and make a 
greater contribution to their country.  This escapes a dominant discourse in their social circle 
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that affirmative action is reverse racism.  Similarly a person who is abused as a child may 
frame this as message from God that they should use their strength in overcoming this trial as 
fuel to end child abuse.  What is important is that „prosaic intertexting‟ gives people 
increased language with which to make alternative meanings, rather than being trapped in 
non-productive dictions.   
 
Prosaic intertexting is both a model of how humans be and a tool to interfere in that be-ing.  
At the level of the person it is useful both as a means for personal trauma resolution and for 
non-traumatic positive personal growth (see therapeutic uses above).  In the second instance 
though it is beneficial for mediating and regulating inter-personal acts.  Three ways of 
thinking about inter-personal acts are as (a) ideology, (b) conflict and (c) a reconciliatory 
society.  I discuss these below with the aim of broadening the scope of prosaic intertexting‟s 
appeal beyond the personal. 
 
To be in conflict one has to have a „legitimate‟ – or legitimate enough – reason, a pretext; 
whether this be an established blood feud, suspected possession of weapons of mass 
destruction or „premenstrual stress‟.  The examples show that the pretext need not be 
universally valid, rather it is an excuse to placate the conscience of the person.  To test the 
universality of my „necessary pretext‟ allegation slap the next person you encounter, without 
provocation.  Even reading this you can see the expression in their face being „why?‟ and feel 
the „urge to explain your action as a social experiment‟ welling up in your mouth.  Justice is 
the apportionment of blame and appropriate punishment, as culturally and contemporarily 
established (see Nozick, 1974; Rawls, 1971; Waltzer, 1983).  There is a need in rendering 
acts intelligible to attribute both narrative cohesiveness and causal relationships to them.  
Moreover, there is a social-regulatory, order-maintenance imperative to attribute the 
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(real/true) narrative and causal relationships to the acts; the imperative to be correct, for my 
version of events to be believed.  By be-ing we lay the foundations of ideological strife 
because be-ing is (as demonstrated in prosaic intertextings model of it) inherently multiple 
and rhetorical.  We each create a version of reality that is coloured and substantiated by the 
unique chronospatial position from which we utter – actualized in the selection of utterances 
that our utterance answers and addresses.  Our constructions cannot be the same as others.  
We are doomed to conflict.  Well, no, not really, but ideological reconciliation is a non-
intuitive process.   
 
Prosaic intertexting offers the starting proposition that agreement is not congruence of be-ing 
in thought, but rather a concurrent act of parallel meaning-acceptance by two utterers.  
Reconciliation is not about finding the, true, version of events, whether science or spirituality, 
Christianity or Hinduism.  Rather it is about finding a way for each version (separately) not to 
preclude or be punitive of others.  Reconciliation is about making be-ing possible for „I‟ that 
believes in the capital punishment as an effective crime deterrent but that other persons hold 
it to be unjustifiable murder.  Reconciliation has no essential value in and of itself though.  I 
use it as an example here though to illustrate the helpful properties of prosaic intertexting.  
Prosaic intertexting helps in over-coming of default-operational ideological strife of life by 
(a) il-legitimating the necessity of the default position, and (b) modeling how new (strife-less) 
positions may be created. 
 
Prosaic intertexting may be equally used deliberately and hegemonically to render particular 
versions of reality as abhorrent or even unintelligible, unthinkable.  Prosaic intertexting 
provides the process by which acts are legitimated and therefore offers the opportunity both 
to cement an ideology and to create a new idea in which „my truth‟ is real and „your truth‟ is 
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as real.  Pragmatically there is an interpersonal therapeutic process that more than one person 
can create less problem-saturated narratives of co-existence.  Mediators and arbitrators 
currently fulfil this role in legal disputes.  Communication between people can be facilitated 
by the acknowledgement that „I‟ have an important role to play in the possible meanings 
other people can make.  Treating meanings as unfinalized and acknowledging the prevalence 
of „misunderstandings‟ allows people to re-negotiate, to forgive, and to seek to reconcile 
through engagement with others.   
 
The potential benefits of prosaic intertexting as an ideological conflict resolution mechanism 
need not only be applied on an inter-individual level.  Nussbaum (1998) has argued for the 
„cultivation of humanity‟ as an imperative of education, a bastion of society.  Society exists 
by virtue of our continued process of be-ing as meaning creating, inter-relating persons, and 
our be-ing is completely circumscribed by the meaning-created society in which we are be-
ing.  Nussbaum (2001) is arguing that, in this society that is made by us and gives the 
necessary context for us to be meaningful, we should create self-stories and act-possibilities 
that transcend ideological conflict.  Indeed, she argues, it is the socially constructed and 
legitimate function of „education‟ as a social bastion and system to perform this function.  By 
arguing that we should strengthen this commitment to education she is arguing for the 
generative capacity of prosaic intertexting to imagine new possibilities of be-ing in the world.    
 
One of the most pervasive effects of modern be-ing are stereotypes.  Stereotypes are an 
outcome of everyday categorizing (Ramsey, Langlois, Hoss, Rubenstein & Griffin, 2004) and 
„voice-seeking‟ (see Wertsch, 2002) as we render the world intelligible.  When faced with a 
paucity of memory events with which to construct a self-narrative for a person, we use 
stereotypes in our heuristic construction of a coherent, intelligible other-act.  Indeed, even if 
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there is a surfeit of actual memory events we still use stereotypes.  We are lazy, or rather we 
are frugal in our expenditure of mental effort.  When we see a person stopping in a 
supermarket to ruffle the hair of a stranger‟s child we may draw on the stereotype that 
„women are caregivers‟, or that „men are sexual predators‟, and legitimize our act of judging 
the behaviour as „safe and moving on‟ or „intervening‟ – as appropriate.  Stereotypes are part 
of the diction with which we create semantic-complexes around act-occurrences.  Stereotypes 
are an archetypal centripetal force – by maintaining a generalized, un-interrogated „truth‟ 
about a „real‟ category.  Their logical counterpart is uttering the act as singular and non-
repeatable – uniqueness through specificity.  Stereotypes are maintained by essentializing and 
finalizing persons as instances of a category of people.  Often such stereotypes are supported 
through the distorted ventriloque of knowledge.  For example, science, logic and rationality is 
ventriloqued in narratives such as this „you know these Africans (read blacks) didn‟t have 
great civilizations like Rome where people could just sit around and think and make art and 
society so it‟s no wonder that they are backward, they just didn‟t get the opportunity to 
develop‟.  Such a reality-narrative legitimates holding Roman-derived/non-African 
civilization-members as superior due to the inevitability of social advancement when that 
society produces a non-working class elite who have the opportunity to „promulgate laws, 
create art and advance science/philosophy‟.  The utterer is also excused of 
continentalism/racism toward Africans, as their accused lack of development is both „true‟ 
and „inevitable‟ as an outcome of the „natural‟ process of social advancement.  Prosaic 
intertexting is, in the third instance, an interrogative mechanism and process by which to de-
construct stereotypes. 
 
The ontology of prosaic intertexting is to treat meaning creating as a centrifugal, generative 
act.  Furthermore, since each person contributing to meaning creating is unique by virtue of 
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their chronospatial position, they are themselves unique meaning-making be-ings, no person 
is only an instance of a category.  Rather the category that they are uttered as part of is 
sustained by this utterance, and their membership of the category is insofar as it serves the 
rhetorical, sense-of-the-world making aim of the utterer.  Stereotypes are not „real‟, 
essentially.  Except they are „real‟ by virtue of their value in calcifying meaning in the 
intentional meaning created complex that allows persons to be together.  To say stereotypes 
are not real is not revolutionary though.  And while we may be satisfied that stereotypes are 
much more difficult to maintain when one engages with the unique humanity of another 
person, prosaic intertexting offers more; by plotting the pathway of active stereotype 
negotiation and dissolution.  Ending the effect of a stereotype is not about showing its 
falsehood, lack of value or evilness.  Rather, ending the effect of a stereotype is about forging 
a new utterance in which (a) the experiential reality of the past stereotype is acknowledged 
but (b) that in the present the stereotypes are not true.  This is similar to the argument against 
post-racialism put forward by Erasmus (2004) and by Goldberg (2004).  Prosaic intertexting 
is the process by which new meanings are made by (a) focusing on prosaic, iterative change 
and (b) creating utterances into different social texts.  Stereotypes are not so much „dissolved-
to-disappear‟ as „resolved-to-have-new-meaning‟. 
 
The effect of stereotypes on everyday life is pervasive.  Steele, Aronson and Spencer‟s  
„stereotype threat/reward theory‟ illustrates how stereotypes affect people‟s behaviour 
quantitatively (see Aronson, Wilson, & Akert, 2005; Steele & Aronson, 1995; Steele, 
Spencer, & Aronson, 2002).  There will be no definitive trends in how a particular person 
acts in the answerability to a particular uttered stereotype.  However, trends are emerging 
which speak to the calcified act-expectancies that persons experience when be-ing in the 
narratival context of a given stereotype.  For example, women, often stereotyped to be weak 
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in mathematics perform worse on examinations of this subject when their be-ing a woman is 
highlighted prior to writing (Spencer, Steele, & Quinn, 1998).  Women who are of Asian 
descent performed better (Ceteris Paribus) on similar mathematics examinations when their 
„Asianness‟, and therefore the stereotype that Asians are good at mathematics, was 
highlighted prior to writing (Shih, Pittinsky, & Ambady, 1999).  In the strictest sense though 
stereotypes are merely special cases of „voices-behind‟ that Wertsch (2002) urges us to 
search for when meaning creating.  The effect of stereotype threat/reward should therefore be 
extrapolated to all be-ing such that a given behaviour is possible as an intelligible act insofar 
as the „voices-behind‟ give it context.  Decalcifying the meaning of stereotypes is, therefore, 
a positive act of creating new voice-possibilities; it is generative, like everyday be-ing.  
Stereotypes with positive effects are valuable resources in this creation.  To continue the 
earlier example, Asian women, when faced with a challenging mathematics examination 
should make their act of writing an act of „Asianness‟, not womanhood.  Alternatively the 
stereotype may be subverted by making the self-act an utterance of defiant uniqueness, by 
saying „I am a woman and I will not be cowed by the prevailing sentiment that women are 
weak at mathematics, I am special, and I am going to show them‟.  Stereotypes are a 
heuristic, a meaning creating device, and a strong thread around which to weave creative be-
ing. 
 
The aim of this essay has been to illustrate the potential value of prosaic intertexting for 
social science.  It is by no means a definitive statement that prosaic intertexting is good in and 
of itself.  The benefit of prosaic intertexting is that it is illustrative of how to bring about 
change, of personal narratives, of inter-personal conflicts and of social discord.  Prosaic 
intertexting is a tool for solving everyday problems of meaning; this does not mean that it is a 
cure-all though.  Meanings are central to persons‟ lives, messing with them could be 
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interpreted as messing with the person.  This is something that requires a very privileged 
social sanction and space to accomplish. 
 
Is prosaic intertexting more than ‘lay’ work? 
 
Is it fair to claim social science is not about understanding „TRUTHS‟ – independently real – 
but about creating „truths‟ – person dependent?  Can the social scientist legitimately be an 
active agent in meaning creation?  Is this not contrary to the logic of science?  In this essay I 
argue that it is philosophically valid for social science to engage in active meaning creation.  
Indeed, I argue that it is philosophically impossible for social science not to engage in active 
meaning creation.  I hope that this essay will leave the reader with the sense that generating 
answerings and addressings is inevitable as a social scientist, and that it is far better to 
acknowledge this and consciously engage in the process.  I also hope to create an alternative 
yard-stick for social science to the independent „validity‟ of results.  This alternative is 
explicitness in positioning and rhetorical purpose for the science – that is: judging social 
science by what it does and what it attempts to do, not how well the text book process is 
followed. 
 
Relativist philosopher looking for a way to keep my philosophy but still have purpose: This 
essay will begin by contrasting two epistemologies (rationalism or meaning is comprehended, 
and empiricism or meaning is observed) according to their conception of meaning-
description.  This is followed by a questioning of the validity, feasibility and usefulness of 
pursuing either of these epistemologies.  An alternative, that meanings cannot be rationally 
derived or observed, but must be created – rendered intelligible – in a continued space of 
rhetorical negotiation between active human persons (including social scientists and their 
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addressees), is posited.  With this alternative established, it is used to render the two earlier 
epistemologies intelligible, thus evidencing the durability, functionality and evaluative 
framework of the proposed epistemology.  
 
But first, a mediatory tool to facilitate the shaping of the essay.  One thing may be many 
things according to the level at which it is enunciated.  In this way a personal computer can 
be a being with will, motives and emotions (usually obstinacy, sabotage of the user and glee 
at their irritation).  It can also be a dead canvas upon which to transcribe the brilliant thoughts 
of a thesis-writer.  Else, it could be a particular flow of electrons through a circuit.  And so 
on.  It is not described as this, it is this.  Dennett (1981) has argued, convincingly, that this is 
not an exercise in describing different, partial facets of the whole thing that is a personal 
computer.  Rather the computer is best conceived as each of these things, and each one, is in 
and of itself, a complete personal computer.  This logic is transferable from personal 
computers to anything of persons.  In one sense this paragraph is a disclaimer for the essay, to 
say that even if either of the two initial epistemological stances seem correct or appealing to 
the reader (as indeed they could, considering their prevalence in both lay and professional 
thinking), keep reading, do not dismiss my critique, according to Dennett (1981) they may 
both be correct.  In another sense this paragraph lays the foundation for the final assertion of 
the essay; that both epistemologies are mistaken in veracity, though they remain useful 
descriptive tools for people creating – not revealing – meaning. 
 
One way to describe: Rationalism.  What is knowable is that which can be critically reflected 
upon and cognitively deduced.  The task for social science is to elucidate that which is 
rationally sound and reasonable.  This extends to the consideration of „qualia‟ (see Jackson, 
1977; 1982) both as a unique topic for social/human science (as a unique feature of human 
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be-ing), and as descriptive term for the extra-observational sensing that social scientists use to 
achieve understanding.  Descartes‟ (1644) classic method of doubting to deduce the essence 
of personhood is an extreme example of the privileging of rational knowing.   
 
The most persistent challenge to rationalism is the problem of knowing other people, or of the 
knowing of other people (see Churchland, 1984; Smith & Jones, 1997).  How can one person 
know (if knowing is an act of self-reflective doubting of non-experienced or reasonable 
things) another person as a knower?  What justification is there for knowing that another 
person knows as I do?  Their knowing is inaccessible to me except for their reporting of it, 
and they could be lying or mistaken.  The simplest solution to this is to add a further qualifier 
to rationalism that assumes that all people are rational beings, and that they do think, feel and 
experience.  Although this undermines strict rationalism it, pragmatically, allows for 
engagement with other people as active agents.  An unlooked for consequence of this 
allowance is that the importance ascribed to the knowing of the thinking subject leads to the 
consequent importance of the thought, felt or experienced,  itself (either phenomenological or 
existential).   
 
A reasonable example of lenient rationalism describing social scientifically: „I experience 
medical crises of loved ones as traumatic.  If I had an emergency visit to a state-run hospital 
in post-Apartheid South Africa I would be acutely aware of my whiteness.  This awareness of 
my whiteness would compound my experience of nervousness and cloud my rational 
decision-making.  Person X is also white, they would therefore also have their rational 
decision-making faculty clouded.  My whiteness is experienced as a threatening social 
category in post-apartheid South Africa.  So, whiteness is a threatened social category in 
post-Apartheid South Africa.  Person Y tells me that, though they are white, when entering a 
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state-run hospital in post-Apartheid South Africa they did not experience a clouding of their 
decision-making faculty.  From this three alternatives can be deduced; (a) the language we 
are using to describe our experience is inconsistent, (b) person Y is lying or is mistaken, (c) 
the ceteris paribus assumption is violated and something else has influenced person Y‟s 
experience of whiteness.  Social science is the study of the person and the person is most 
closely known through my person. 
 
Another way to describe: Empiricism.  What is knowable is that which can be evidentially 
supported and observationally derived.  The task for social science is to determine that which 
is likely to continue to be sense-able as it is now and that which is to change and in what 
direction.  This extends also to logically derived things that can – theoretically, but not as yet 
– be „observed‟, but only insofar they are supported by the continued veracity of their logical 
precepts.  Hume‟s (1737) classic deduction that causality cannot be positively proven – as a 
future, counter-causal event may yet occur – but rather must be assumed when (a) event A 
always precedes „effect‟ A, and (b) there is a necessary connection between the two events – 
is an extreme example of the privileging of observational deduction in knowing. 
 
The most consistent challenge to empiricism is that much of humanness is unobservable.  
How can seemingly intangible, varied and organic (always growing and changing) parts of 
human life, such as love, class or health, be known?  What use is a social science that cannot 
know these things?  Are they to be reduced to what is actually observable about them (brain-
chemical reactions/social signifiers, income quintile/consensus rating or lack of diagnosed 
disease/chromosomal mutation) through accurate, strictly applied operationalization?  Where 
is the line between in-category and out-category and who decides this?  And is something 
uniquely human not lost in the process – qualia.  The simplest solution is to deny the 
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existence of qualia and claim that errors or lack of contemporary progress is founded in a 
failure of rigor in the method, not in the method itself.  Much of modern science is answering 
to this view, but there remains a definitive lack of observable proofs and reliance on tools of 
logic (Ockham‟s razor et cetera) among advocates.   
 
A tangible example of strict empiricism  describing social scientifically: People (mentally 
well-functioning adults, probably from the west) with loved ones (those observed to affect the 
daily and life-span functioning of the subject through interpersonal interactions) are observed, 
on average, to experience trauma (an increased heart-beat, palm-sweating and heightened 
nervous activity) when their loved one has a medical crisis (an illness or injury for which 
emergency assistance is required).  White (of Caucasian decent) people are observed to rarely 
(less than a particular % of patient admissions) visit state-run Post-Apartheid hospitals.  
People are observed to experience heightened self-awareness (an increase in both frequency 
and degree of self-descriptive adjectives/adverbs in the thought chain) when in unfamiliar 
(non-routine or experiential outlier) situations.  Heightened self-awareness impedes non-self 
thought by definition.  Therefore a white person with a loved one with a health crisis will be 
observed to have impeded cognition (lack of logical flow) in their decision-making when 
entering a state-run hospital in post-Apartheid South Africa.  Social science treats the person 
as an instantiation of observed truths about the nature of personhood by clearly defined 
measure. 
 
This way to create as meaningful: Interpretationism.  Nothing is knowable in and of itself, but 
rather is made intelligible through a positive act of interpretation.  The task for social science 
is both to render human acts intelligible and to advance the interpretative capacity of people 
in the everyday.  This extends to generating new language in which human acts and meanings 
39 
 
can be understandable.  A classic proof for the inescapability of meaning creating is 
Wittgenstein‟s (see Wittgenstein & Anscombe, 1958) question of a beetle in a box: Person G 
holds their hands out to you, holding a closed box.  Person G says that the box contains a 
beetle, but how are you to know what a beetle is?  Only by opening the box to both of you, 
and reaching consensus between you that what I am holding is a box with a beetle in it, can it 
actually be known that there is a beetle in the box.  Before the box is opened and shared the 
thing in the box is un-intelligible and has, for all intents and purposes, no meaning except as 
„thing that I am trying to convince you is a beetle‟.  Similarly, all human acts are intrinsically 
meaningless except insofar as their meaning is made intelligible, in an intentional world, 
between people.   
 
The most consistent challenge to interpretationism is escaping the meaninglessness of 
relativity.  How can social science be sure of its subject if there is no fixed meaning to the 
subject?  How can human things be described if description itself changes how it is 
understood and therefore what it means, and, post-description, the meaning of the things 
continues to change with future iterations of consensing?  How is social science any more 
than lay philosophizing, how can it be rigorously pursued?  The simple solution is to shrug 
one‟s shoulders and accept that, though this may not be what we wanted for social science, 
this does not alter the reality that this is what social science is.  A more difficult solution is 
attempted in this thesis; to actually answer the questions of how things become meaningful 
and how social science can create future meanings in accordance with its interpretationist 
objectives. 
 
A meaning-advancing example of making rationalism and empiricist stories intelligible: see 
above.  Intelligibility is the act of creating an interpretative context for a thing such that it 
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may be used to fulfil the rhetorical aims of the utterance.  The rhetorical aims of this essay 
are to create rationalism and empiricism as rich and cohesive, but ultimately erroneous, 
epistemologies for social science.  The legitimacy of an intelligibility rendering is established 
in partnership with the „hearer‟ and so is idiosyncratic.  Certain elements have become 
normative in legitimacy establishment.  (1) Providing a narrative genesis/heritage story: 
„Rationalism and empiricism are thought traditions derived and evolved from classical Greek 
musings on the nature of what people may know‟.  (2) Providing relative examples: 
„Rationalism and empiricism are opposites ends of a polar continuum of the two ways that 
people can know‟.  And (3) Supplying the thing as an answer to a problem: How can people 
know things that cannot be observed?‟ – rationalism, and „How can people verify that 
something exists and therefore what it is?‟ – empiricism.  This is not an exhaustive list of 
intelligibility strategies, it is a look at the common process that intelligibility renderings 
follow.  This is not an act of definition, it is an act of definition.   Social science is the person 
as a rhetorically positioned subject to be created in aim-motivated terms. 
 
What is human life about?  Or rather, what level(s) of description should social science give 
in creating understanding to this question?  Does social science follow natural science?  Does 
social science follow art?  Or is/should social science be something surprisingly different – 
concerned not at all with description?  This essay argues that understanding, knowledge and 
the specific answer social science should be giving to the meaning of human be-ing, exists 
only in a special space between people.  It is the task of social science to privilege that space 
as the river through which intelligibility flows.  I argue that intelligibility is the result of 
propositioning the edges of language that people use to negotiate meaning, and it is 
impressed that the process of meaning negotiation is at once the subject, mechanism and aim 
of social science – or rather, that it should be.  Human things and life are special subjects, 
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their study therefore requires special ways of knowing.  Because human things are 
propositional and intentional, their meaning is not fixed to them, therefore any epistemology 
of knowing a subject for what it – intrinsically – is, is doomed to failure.  The reality of what 
is knowable about human things is different from the reality of what we may know of natural 
things.  Knowing human things is using them to interact and co-create meaning with other 
people.  Social science is using human things to interact with and create-in-potential the 
social.  Human be-ing may be about anything, social science is about how life comes to be 
about the particular things it does and the meanings that they are given. 
 
How can prosaic intertexting be developmentally definitive of persons? 
 
If prosaic intertexting is the definitive capacity of persons, then how do persons come to have 
this capacity?  The purpose of this essay is to demonstrate how prosaic intertexting is a 
philogenetically and ontogenetically adaptive ability.  First, I present a brief overview of 
what both apes and babies are able to do in relation to another.  Then, I argue that what both 
apes and babies lack is effective use of prosaic intertexting.  Finally, I present scenarios 
whereby prosaic intertexting is evolutionarily and developmentally adaptive.  This essay 
establishes prosaic intertexting as a distinctly human capacity that explains how persons can 
exist in an intentional world of meaning-negotiations.  I would like the reader to acknowledge 
that the model of prosaic intertexting has validity for social science as a social act. 
 
The narrative historian: If an ape‟s/baby‟s eyes were focusing on this sentence, giving 
correctly sequential attention to each word, still, reading (meaning creating) would not be 
going on here.  Why not?  People share many of the biological bits that enable reading 
(perceptual and processing matter in our brains) with apes and babies, yet they are unable to 
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do so.  As intriguingly, babies „grow-up‟, their brains develop, and they become able to read, 
and apes do not (at least not without significant training and then only to a very limited 
degree).  More than just reading texts, babies become meaning creating and rhetorically 
sharing people, able to be in a complex, humanly-intentional world, and apes do not.  How?  
If we are the pinnacle of social meaning creation development, then are apes and babies 
simply poorer developmental models, or is there a qualitative difference between what they 
can do, and what we do?  In developmental psychology (see Bjorklund & Pellegrini, 2000; 
Bornstein & Lamb, 2005; Lerner, 2002) and evolutionary psychology (see Buss, 1995; 
Durrant & Ellis, 2003; Tooby & Cosmides, 2005) an idea is that by determining if and what 
babies or apes are „thinking‟  we will be more able to say something about our thoughts. 
 
So, what can apes and babies do?  And what model of human think/be-ing does this reveal?  
The general frame for rendering apes and babies „thinkings‟ intelligible is called “mind-
reading”.  Mind-reading refers to the ability to act upon an anticipation of another beings 
„intentions‟.  These intentions are what are supposed, by the mind-reader, to be motivating 
the other beings‟ likely future acts.  There is some debate (see Whiten, 1991) whether or not 
the mind-reader needs to have a formal mental model of the other persons „mind‟ or if they 
can mind-read sub-consciously.  For the purposes of this essay having a formal model of the 
other‟s mind is treated as the pinnacle of the mind-reading scale.  Indeed, with a strict 
definition developmental and evolutionary psychology would have little to talk about.  But 
again, what can apes and babies do?  Or rather, what acts are illustrative of „mind-reading‟ in 
apes and babies? 
 
Apes – Dawkins and Krebs (1978) argue that some apes are able to experience „righteous 
indignation‟; they become upset when a human handler plays a trick on them.  The apes do 
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not get upset if the human handler‟s „trick‟ is judged to be accidental.  Confirmation of the 
experience of righteous indignation among apes would confirm that these apes act as if 
people/others are beings that try to do things and can fail; they have intentions.  If others (and 
possibly myself) have intentions, then their „mind‟ can be read as the seat of intentions and 
their acts read/anticipated by ascribing intentions to them.  Unfortunately the evidence for the 
„experience of righteous indignation is only anecdotal.   
 
Menzel (1974) and Nishida (1987) have argued that certain apes can counter deception with 
deceptive acts of their own in response to being tricked or deceived.  Again, the other can be 
represented as having a „mind‟ that is a deceptive tool and their acts predicted on the basis of 
an intent to deceive.  One of the most positive (as opposed to reactive) demonstrations of 
deception is documented in Byrne and Whiten (1987).  Labelled „telling tales‟, certain apes 
have been observed to „rat‟, „nark‟, or tell-on members of their social group to the tittle-
tattle‟s advantage.  For example, in a sexual hierarchy that is a „troop‟ a junior level member 
may alert the dominant male to a tryst between two intermediate level members.  The 
dominant male would move to reprimand the two culprits, and the junior member now has 
access to the food that the dominant male had been enjoying.  If it can be confirmed that the 
junior member had the intention to gain access to the food then it is an act of mind-reading 
genius, predicting the dominant male‟s acts based on their „attitude‟ to behind-the-bush 
parleys.  Observation is yet to prove this though. 
 
Goodall (1986) documented how certain apes, in specific settings, would modify the 
behaviour of others according to the demands of this setting.  For example, „hushing‟ or 
holding a front paw/hand over a baby‟s mouth when there is a need to for silence.  Similarly, 
de Waal (1982) notes that certain apes will attempt to modify their own outward appearance, 
44 
 
supposedly in fear of giving too much away to others.  For example, an ape that is scared of 
another may put their front paws/hands in front of their face and „hide‟ their fear response 
from others.  Suppressing another‟s behaviour indicates an „awareness‟, a mind-reading, of 
what the other is likely to do.  Altering one‟s own appearance indicates an „awareness‟ that 
others are likely to „read-my-mind‟ from what I do and look like. 
 
Certain apes have been taught to use „language‟, in a diversity of forms (see Gardner & 
Gardner, 1979; Patterson & Linden, 1981; Rumbaugh & Gill, 1977).  The results of these 
studies all illustrate that while most apes can learn to use some elements of language, with 
differing limits on the number of words, they lack a „natural grammar‟ to use the diction (see 
Savage-Rumbaugh & Lewin, 1994; Simon, 1993).  Furthermore Boysen and Berntson (1995) 
demonstrate that learning an abstract symbol system – in this case for numbers – can extend 
apes‟ ability to act, refusing temptation where they had previously been unable to.  Language 
seems to be an imposed rigour on the conceptualizing ape.  The mind-reading is likely to be 
in the form of a sense or feeling and not an abstract, „narrative‟ formulation thereof.  No 
language using ape has yet been able to answer the holy grail question: „What are you 
thinking‟? 
 
Babies – Babies are more usually part of human interactions than apes and we are thus 
blessed with a much richer trove of observed interactions.  Still, what are we seeing in our 
babies who cannot yet talk?  Reddy (1991) argues that the key to understanding early mind-
reading in babies is in their „mucking about‟.  Babies are observed to perform a variety of 
acts inviting others to appreciate them, to play with them, or to interact with them.  These acts 
include „smiling‟, vocalizing or waving of appendages.  This all involves a sensing that others 
will act in response to my acts.  Also, babies will repeatedly perform acts which amuse 
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another, implying a „sense‟ of appreciating how the other will re-act to the baby‟s acts.  
Babies also repeat acts that are semi-annoying within an established game, thus 
demonstrating an appreciation that others can have different intentions depending on the 
setting they are in (game-setting as opposed to normal life).  Babies will also employ pretend, 
the non-serious use of affect, to invoke reactions (usually humour but always attention) in 
others.  The baby must thus „read‟ how the other is likely to react to „their own‟ act/affect. 
 
The importance of understanding, playing-along-with and generating falsehoods is illustrative 
of an ability to „mind-read‟.  Deceptive jokes/lies are intentional falsehoods.  In order for 
them to be acted on as a joke or lie the baby must understand the intention of the joker/lie-er.  
Leekam (1991) argues that babies are capable of acting on different degrees of intentional 
falsehoods as they grow.  This argument implies that babies become progressively better 
mind-readers.  Classic experiments – such as the „Sally doll test‟ (see Baron-Cohen, Leslie & 
Frith, 1985), the false-belief task (see Wimmer & Perner, 1983), the appearance-reality task 
(see Gopnik & Astington, 1988) and the false-photo task (see Sabbagh & Moses, 2006) – 
have demonstrated that age is a definite factor in whether a baby is likely or unlikely to 
understand a joke or not to be fooled by a lie.  This ability is noticeably retarded in children 
with autism and not in children with other mental difficulties (Leslie, 1991).  This leads 
Muratori and Maestro (2007) to argue that the poor social affect and interactions that 
characterize autism is due to a difficulty in mind-reading of others (see also Barresi, 2007; 
Colle & Grandi, 2007).  Mind-reading is treated as definitive of human be-ing; we are the 
„Machiavellian ape‟ (see Shreeve, 1991). 
 
An important difference between apes and babies is that almost all babies grow to be persons.  
This prompts Carrithers (1991) to argue that human be-ings have a special mental ability to 
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mind-read, and this develops as we grow.  Carrithers (1991) calls this ability „narrativity‟ and 
defines it as the uniquely human ability to create meaning of acts by placing them in a 
historic-narrative context.  Bruner (1986) echoes this when he argues that there are two 
„modes of thought‟, the paradigmatic – to do with logic and computing – and the narrative – 
concerning the human condition.  To people an act is not an individual unit.  Rather, an act is 
always made part of a story, a narrative.  For example, when we see another walking down 
the street, they are not just „walking down the street‟, they are „walking to go buy bread and 
milk as their partner asked them to and they forgot and now they trying to make up for this 
error in judgement‟.  Carrithers (1991) argues that what is definitive of human be-ing is being 
able to locate the meaning of an act in a narrative.  I argue that what is definitive of human 
be-ing is being able to create a narrative in which the act has meaning. 
 
Reading is not an act of interpretation.  A reader does not identify the location of the words in 
the narrative they are trying to convey.  A reader must place the meaning/s of words in a 
„narrative‟.  This „narrative‟ must be constructed as significant to the reader and it must 
legitimate the reader‟s answering act of reading.  Apes/Babies fail to read not because they 
cannot read the mind of the author and other readers.  Rather, they fail to read because they 
are unable to make proactive meaning statements about what they have read, in a self-
coherent „narrative‟, to their own and to others‟ ears.  Persons must „read what is‟, not „read 
what is‟.  This is not done with self-awareness, rather it is the definitive condition of be-ing.  
When it is done with awareness it is considered „art‟.  Apes‟/Babies‟ brains do not capture the 
complexity of this creation.  Rather, their brains are concerned with identifying what is there.  




So, if prosaic intertexting, creating meaning by placing the act in the context of social „texts‟, 
is definitive of human be-ing, then how do we come to be in this way?  For prosaic 
intertexting to be philogenetically developmental it must be evolutionarily adaptive.  For 
prosaic intertexting to be ontogenetically developmental it must be socially adaptive.  I now 
present two stories – narratives if you like – by which prosaic intertexting may evolve and be 
socially demanded: 
 
Philogenesis – prosaic intertexting evolves as a response to increased pressure to keep 
resources in an intelligence-competitive environment.  Those with the greatest capacity to 
create meaning of acts and events are more likely to (a) cooperate, (b) remember and (c) 
transfer competitive advantages to their group/gene pool.  Deacon (1998) argues that evolved 
language capacity is definitive of human genetic advantage; I argue that it is the specific 
generative capacity to create meaning that language affords us that is the real advantage.  The 
following paragraph I have invented as illustrative of how creating alternative (goal-oriented) 
meaning for an event – in this case proto-human A being the recipient of an aggressive 
display from the hunt-leader – can be competitively advantageous. 
 
A proto-human hunt: 
Proto-human A: Is attacked in an aggressive display be the hunt-leader.  Normal reaction is 
fear and self-defense.  Why did the hunt-leader attack me?  We are on a hunt.  The hunt is not 
a normal situation.  We must help each other in order for the hunt to be successful.  The hunt-
leader‟s actions need to be understood as part of a non-normal situation.  The hunt-leader is 





Proto-humans who were more likely to create alternative meanings for the acts of their 
fellows and the events that affect them have greater capacity for generating novel or 
alternative acts themselves.  In times of crisis or change, the ability to generate new meanings 
and acts is imperative to survival.  Cooperating with fellows, in spite of affective relations 
between group members, is particularly adaptive in times of crises where affect is likely to be 
strained.  In this sense, while cooperation is in itself valuable it is the ability to cooperate (a) 
toward a super-ordinate, time-independent goal and (b) doing so regardless of immediate 
group affective dynamics that is most adaptive in times of change.  Prosaic intertexting 
makes this type of cooperation all the more possible through the generative capacity of 
meaning creation.  Proto-humans cooperate not because they like each other at that moment, 
but because they want the same outcome.  The paragraph below is invented to illustrate how 
a suspension of a son‟s belief to subordinate them to the trusted experiences of an „elder‟ – 
the father – can be competitively advantageous as the „son‟ learns from generations of 
experience. 
 
A proto-human boy and father: 
Father: There are many different types of poisonous vegetables.  Never eat any that are red, 
except these ones.  These ones are good to eat.  But do not eat too many of them, only two 
handfuls, otherwise your stomach will hurt.  Red is the colour of fire, if you eat red 
vegetables there will be a fire in your stomach and you will not be able to put it out, it will 
consume you from the inside.   
Son: Why do these ones‟ fire not burn you? 
Father: These ones grow close the ground and as they grow their fire leeches into the earth 
and grows weaker, but the fire is there, but it is only a spark. 
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Son (years later to his own son): The earth leaches the fire out of these vegetables my son, 
that is why you may eat some of them. 
 
While the example may seem mundane, the ability for proto-humans to create meanings 
explaining their world enabled them to remember complex things.  It is easier to remember 
the message of a story than to remember an isolated „fact‟ and we as humans are driven to 
create facts-within-stories to this end (see Dennett, 1988; Ricouer, 1985; Schacter, 1996).  
This ability is tied to the linguistic capacity to tell stories in words, but it is the ability to 
generate alternative, contingent and exceptional stories that confers the evolutionary 
advantage.  The paragraph below is invented to illustrate how being able to generate 
alternative „interpretations‟/meanings of experiences and knowledge is competitively 
advantageous to proto-humans as (in this case) disadvantageous conclusions – those of the 
„apprentice‟ – can be re-invented to prevent undesirable conflict. 
 
A proto-human elder and apprentice: 
Apprentice: Where do we come from elder? 
Elder: We are the children of the sky, our father is the sun and our mother is the earth. 
Apprentice: So the sun and the earth lay together? 
Elder: No, I am telling you that we are here, this is who we are and where we come from.  
The sun is our energy, the earth feeds us and the sky gives us a home. 
Apprentice: So we have no home, we wander. 
Elder: No, I am telling you that all that is under the sky is ours as long as the sun and earth 
remain. 
Apprentice: So the people from the mountains, they have no home, they live in ours? 
Elder: And we live in theirs. 
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Apprentice: They are our brothers and sisters. We need not fight them. 
 
Meaning creation is not merely facilitative of, it is, meaning transference.  Prosaic 
intertexting is the creation of meaning between persons.  The ability to create multiple 
answerings with the same meaning proposition means that two (or more) people can persist in 
a dialogue until a common meaning is created.  The adaptive advantage of meaning 
transference is that one person benefits not just from the experiences they have personally.  
This compounded by the adaptive advantage beings transferred most effectively to people 
closest (in terms of shared social space) to the person and thus most likely to share familial 
genes.  This capacity to create multiple meanings also lays the foundation for deceiving and 
misleading competitors.  Prosaic intertexting evolves because those who have it are more 
likely to work together, remember and transfer meanings and thereby preserve both 
themselves and members of their group (who most likely share at least some of their genes). 
 
Ontogenesis – prosaic intertexting is nurtured in a growing baby as a response to social 
pressure to relate to others.  Babies must get attention and sustenance from caregivers for 
long periods in early life.  Persons must cooperate with others in order for their acts to fit-in 
and be supported by the social structure.  I argue that prosaic intertexting enables babies, 
children and adults to access social resources necessary to their survival.  One thing 
necessary to survival, when you have a mind as socially-oriented and intelligent as ours, is to 
have meaning.  A lack of personal meaning is “anomie” (see Durkheim, 1951; 1960), a 
suicidal malaise.  The paragraph below is invented to illustrate the complexity of nameless 





A baby in a birth canal: 
Warm-wet, aaaaaaarrrr.  The baby enters the world: Cool-empty, RRRRGGGHHHHH, 
bright-shadow-lines, blood-metal-disinfectant.  She is clean and swaddled by a nurse: Dry-
soft-cool, babble-sigh-babble, roundconstantshape-colour, disinfectant.  Her lungs are tested: 
Pain, WAAAAHHHH-sigh-laugh, roundconstantshapewithupturnedlineonit-colour; 
disinfectant.  She is carried to her parents: rocking-moving, hush, 
roundconstantshapewithupturnedlineonit-changinglinesandcolour, disinfectant.  And she is 
cuddled by her mother: warm-soft-pressure, cooing, 
tworoundsimilarshapeswithupturnedlinesonthem-colour, disinfectant-sweat.   
 
How does a baby make sense of their sensory input?  The above paragraph is a jumble of 
words in an attempt to simulate the input the neonate‟s brain receives, but it is a poor 
approximation.  Only some of the heard-sense can be written without words, and words will 
be unavailable to the neonate.  Even the division of sensory input into touch, hearing, sight, 
smell/taste is an answering of language.  So how can a baby make sense of their senses?  This 
thesis contests that they do not, at least not in the sense that persons make things sensible.  
Rather, the process of becoming sense-makers follows step-wise development of shared 
learning. As a start, the baby must discriminate between what is it, and what is not-it.  There 
are three mechanisms by which this differentiation can occur – proprioception (see Sacks, 
1985), conterminousness or  dual-touch (having two points of the body touch each other), and 
differentiatioin by associations of contiguous multi-sensory inputs.  These mechanisms 
function independently but complementarily.  Through them the baby may differentiate what 
is it; and the it is differentiated as an acting, self-perceptive and spatially-defined thing 
respectively.  But for now, with this level of processing sensory inputs, the baby only has a 
„sense of self‟, inarticulate and unarticulated.  The paragraph below is invented to illustrate 
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the intensely categorizing and labeling environment a baby enters as their caregivers talk to 
them, and this environment includes their selves. 
 
Mother and baby at the zoo:  
„Such a cute baby boy, aren‟t you Jack?  Yes you are, yes you are.  Look, what is that over 
there?  That is an elephant, can you see how big and grey and tall it is.  One day you will be 
big and tall and strong too my boy.  What is that there next to the elephant Jack?  That is a 
tortoise, can you see it?  A tortoise has a hard shell all around its body; can you see the hard 
shell?  It is yellow and brown and bumpy.  And what is this over here in the pram?  This is 
Jack; he is small and soft and has brown hair.  He is ‘smells nice’ and is ‘happy’ and I love 
him very much‟. 
 
How does the „sense of self‟ become articulated, a description of self?  The above paragraph 
illustrates a particular kind of sensory input.  What is sensed is directed and framed.  
Attention is drawn to particular stimuli (the visible about the animals and the visible, scent 
and relational about Jack), and these stimuli are viewed in a particular way (size and colour 
of the elephant and colour and texture of the tortoise). It furthermore has a particular modus 
operandi for rendering sensory input intelligible. A next step in the process of becoming a 
sense-maker is to learn that things have meaning.  This meaning is concrete; it is the thing, it 
is not a description of it.  Piaget (1928; 1952; 1953) described the thinking of children in this 
stage as „concrete operational‟, explaining that cognitive tasks, such as conservation and 
reversibility, are dependent on knowing the character of a thing, regardless of how it is 
currently perceived.  But what enables this change?  While the will to describe and categorize 
is probably genetically hard-coded, language is a key mediator of both the learning and the 
expression of this ability.  All words are categorical or descriptive, regardless of the word‟s 
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„part-of-speech‟; either of things, events or relationships.  But language is more than words, 
using language is a positive act of meaning-finding/fixing/making/use.  This is categorical of 
language.  “Aaahh” is not language, “„Aaaahh‟ yelped Thami” is language.  There is a pay-
off: As soon as language is used to describe this description supplants the sense of the world 
of the baby.  Similarly the self becomes a self as described, not a „sense of self‟.  It is no 
longer possible for the brain to make non-linguistic sense of stimuli.  The paragraph below is 
invented to illustrate the social mediatory process by which children are guided to put a 
perspective of self forward, the child is taught to hold an opinion. 
 
Father and child building a tree-house: 
Child: Dad, what do you call that thing you are using? 
Father:  Which thing do you mean my boy? 
Child: That thing in your hands. 
Father: Oh, this tool is called a spirit level.  Can you tell what I should use it for? 
Child: No. 
Father: Well look what happens when I put it down on the floor.  Do you see the bubbles? 
Child: Yes, there are three of them. 
Father: That is right, there are three of them.  Do you know what I use the tool for yet? 
Child: No.  The bubbles.  I don‟t know. 
Father: Now look what happens when I put the spirit level on this branch. 
Child: The bubbles moved. 
Father: Yes they did.  Why do you think they moved? 
Child: I dunno. 
Father: Tell me, would you like your tree-house to be skew? 
Child: No, that would be silly. 
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Father: Yes it would be silly if your tree-house was as skew as this branch. 
Child: Yes. Dad? 
Father: Yes my boy? 
Child: Does that tool tell you if something is skew or not? 
Father:  That‟s right!  You see, if the bubble is not in the middle of those lines then it is skew. 
Child: Cool.  Dad, can I use the skew-machine-tool to measure mom‟s head? 
 
How does the self as something described become the self as a describer?  The cognitive shift 
is from object to subject, from described as a fact and description as an act.  The above 
paragraph is an illustrative example of a particular social arrangement in which one person 
calls on the other to create something as meaningful and supports this process.  What is 
sensed is no longer directed and framed; rather, the process of discovering/defining what is is 
now directed, framed and scaffolded.  The child is inducted and assisted into a world in 
which their „self‟ is agentive, a describer, a meaning-creator, by sharing their meaning-
created with other persons.  This final step in the personhood is necessarily dialogic.  
Meaning-made is necessarily meaning-shared.  Vygotsky (1964; 1978; 2004) illustrates how 
interpersonal interactions form the blue-print for intrapersonal reasoning.  Luria (1961; 1976; 
1982), Luria and Yudovich (1959) and Vygotsky (1964; 1978; 2004) also illustrate how 
important social meanings are for individual „understandings‟ of the world.  Finally, Cole 
(1996; 1998) and Cole, Gay, Glick and Sharp (1971) illustrate how people, social 
arrangements and social artefacts mediate the meaning-individually-made of human things.  
While the importance of other people is consistent on all these accounts, what is 
unquestioned is the individual agency of people to make meaning of, with and through social 
(human) things.  Such agency is inherent to dialogic, interpersonal, inter-agentive 
interactions.  To dialogue with a person is to call them to create meaning from what you have 
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uttered.  And, what you have uttered must be sensible, be answerable to, within existing 
social meanings.  Creating meaning is interpolation into meanings-made (socially).  The self 
is defined by its discreteness, by things (and it as a thing) capacity to hold meaning, and by its 
ability to create meaning as shared by people. 
 
So prosaic intertexting is a distinctively human capacity, making persons distinct from apes 
and babies.  This distinction is made on the basis of creative meaning generation capacity.  
The essay has shown that human beings can do several things that apes and babies cannot, 
and in the essay argue that the culmination of these abilities is what is most definitive of 
personhood.  Firstly, human beings can cooperate toward a super-ordinate goal regardless of 
immediate stimuli.  Secondly, human beings can suspend the inferences of personal 
experiences and learn from others.  Thirdly, human beings can create alternatives to 
meanings such that these new meanings best support adaptive actions.  The essay also shows 
the process by which a baby can become into this cooperative, trusting and creative person.  
Firstly, the baby experiences stimuli directly and some stimuli come to be accepted as 
familiar or novel.  Familiar stimuli are freely associated with other familiar, auditory stimuli, 
and subsequent novel stimuli are associated with novel auditory stimuli.  Secondly, the world, 
and the self in the world becomes a thing to be categorized.  Thirdly, the self becomes the 
categorizer.  Prosaic intertexting is about the creative generation of meaning.  It evolved in 
response to pressure to compete among intelligent proto-humans in climates of resource 
pressure.  Prosaic intertexting develops as humans grow in answer to social pressure to be 
meaningful participants in inter-personal interactions.  We think we are more intelligent than 
apes and babies because we are able to relate to each other, especially in the context of 
novelty.  We are able to solve problems in the world, and share this knowledge with others 
who we want to. 
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What do we have to let go of if we are to believe prosaic intertexting? 
 
Embracing a new idea requires you to give up others.  Prosaic intertexting aims at a 
revolution in the social sciences.  There are thus likely idea-costs of embracing the 
revolution.  Indeed, prosaic intertexting is only intelligible in terms of a questioning and 
supplanting of certain commonly held assumptions.  The purpose of this essay is to explicate 
ideas/assumptions that are untenable to prosaic intertexting.  This essay defines prosaic 
intertexting by its claim to revolution.  While the previous essay called prosaic intertexting as 
an answer to problems of the ontogenetic and philogenetic development of human be-ings, 
this essay will call the prosaic intertexting model as an answer to six social scientific 
conceptual problems.  The essay is a collection, not a list, of the conceptual problems of 
social science.  Prosaic intertexting is argued to be the a way in which all the problems can be 
solved, together, by giving us new diction with which to talk about these problems. 
 
The dissatisfied cynic of social science‟s contemporary value: Social science will only 
continue to be valuable if social scientists can create social science in new ways.  One of the 
ways to create in new ways is to question old assumptions.  This essay is (a) an explication of 
five assumptions of life that are untenable to prosaic intertexting and (b) illustrative of the 
type of assumption questioning that prosaic intertexting encourages. 
 
Point One.  Persons are not their bodies.  Consider a person‟s body.  It can be your body, my 
body or any others‟ body as long as it is a person‟s body.  Why is this body necessarily a 
person‟s body?  Is it coherent to think of a single body being more than one person‟s body?  
Not really, even conjoined twins are thought of as having their (two) bodies joined.  
Similarly, people diagnosed with multiple personality disorder are not thought to be more 
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than one person in a single body but rather a person who (mistakenly) believes that they are 
multiple selves (see W.H.O., 2007).  As people we consider ourselves as contiguous and 
synonymous with „our‟ body.  It is difficult, without some Cartesian doubting, to consider a 
person without a body.  I contend though that this does not mean that a person is „their‟ body, 
or rather, a person is not because of their body.  Consider that the molecules that make up a 
body vibrate among themselves, yet we do not think of persons as vibrating particle 
collections.  Consider also that the skin that covers a living body is made up of „dead‟ cells, 
yet we do not think of a person as a thing wrapped in a dead casing.  Consider „body‟ odour.  
On particularly hot days this may waft in irregular patterns around a person.  Is the smell part 
of the body?  Is it part of the person?  I contend that smell is of the body, but is a transient 
characteristic of the person.  To employ the language of logic: a body is a necessary but 
insufficient condition for a person.  Does this mean that we need a meta-physical 
„soul‟/homunculus – as contended in Smith and Jones (1997) – containing who we really are?  
No, never, preposterous (see Armstrong, 1993; Rosenthal, 1971).  Consider rather what is 
meant by a „body‟.  A body is a physical thing, composed of, on the smallest scale people 
have imagined, sub-atomic particles, combined in ways recognizable to us as atoms, 
chemicals, proteins and, most importantly, genetic code.  Dennett (1981) describes what I just 
did as merely changing the level at which something is described, this does not mean that the 
thing – in my example a „body‟ – actually exists at this level.  Rather the thing exists at that 
level at which it is rendered intelligible.  My claim is that we should agree to leave the term 
„body‟ to levels of description closer than or equal to biology.  Persons should not be 
confused with „their‟ body.  The term „embodied‟ signifies the experiential, felt „reality‟ of 
be-ing.  In line with the above reasoning this term should really be called „empersoned‟; the 
meaningful impact that the dialogic complex in which a person utters themselves has on their 
58 
 
experience.  Utterances are not verbal things, they are „empersoned‟ interjections into an 
intentional world.   
 
Point two.  Persons do not exist.  At least in any manner other than there being meaning „of 
them‟ present in an intentional world.  Persons only exist if their propositional utterings are 
consummated by other persons; a person is not the sole author of their being (Bakhtin, 1993).  
The isiZulu (a language predominantly spoken in large parts of eastern South Africa) proverb 
of umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu sums my reasoning completely.  Literally translated it means 
„a person becomes/is a person through/by means of people‟.  In order for the person‟s be-ing 
utterances to have meaning they must be answered by utterances from other people.  A body 
whose actions have no consequence in any intentional world of other people is not a person.  
In a village in ancient times the shunned „sinner‟ who is not spoken to, who is actively 
ignored, almost ceases to be a person.  They only continue to exist insofar as the people in the 
village have to think to ignore them, to think „this person is shunned, I must ignore them‟.  
The shunned-one‟s be-ing as a person is totally defined by this reality, they are a thing to be 
shunned and ignored in other people‟s thinking and that is all they are as a person.  The 
memory of who they were before the shunning merely adds coherence to how their now-
shunned person is what it is in the thinking of the others.  The shunned-one cannot be 
anything but shunned; their only chance in defining their personhood is in legitimating new 
actions as recognizable as the actions of a shunned one.  This point illustrates the power of 
the textual embodiment of be-ing to define the parameters, the diction of be-ing.  Similarly 
children cannot be as persons (partly) because they are defined by their „child‟ status (which 
may or may not be dependent on their chronological age), their actions, their utterances of be-
ing is parametered by the imaginations of their others.  A child, regardless of age, cannot 
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romantically love as a sexually mature person; this is unthinkable and therefore cannot be 
consummated. 
 
Point three.  Actually though, people really do not exist.  Or rather, a person does not exist as 
a person for any longer than the split second in which their utterance of be-ing is 
consummated.  A person utters (in an embodied meaning-creating sense, not just in the verbal 
sense), this utterance is answered, the person exists as this person – the be-ing that holds the 
meaning that makes the answered utterance intelligible – only for the split second that it 
happens.  There is no reason to hold identity between the person who utters once and the 
person that utters again, in spite in their bodies being identical.  Hume (1737) recognized that 
such identity (a thing is the same thing through time and space) is based on assumption.  I 
contend that identity is a rhetorical tool for making utterances intelligible in an intentional 
human world.  If we did not assume that the Graeme who wrote Essay A is the same Graeme 
who wrote Essay B this thesis would be less intelligible.  This does not mean that Graeme is 
the same person on September 28 as on September 29.  „I‟ am today more tired than „I‟ was 
yesterday.  Rather, it means, that for the purposes of rendering this thesis intelligible and 
answering to it, you need Graeme to be the same person.  Tiredness is inconsequential to the 
intelligibility of this utterance.  Similarly I used „I‟ to describe a continuous entity under 
change, it would not have held the same meaning to say „Graeme A‟ is more tired than 
„Graeme B‟ was yesterday.  Here it seems that the two Graemes are different, and that is not 
the point of the utterance.  Identity is a meaning-creating mechanic.  If „a person‟ can be 
considered as different „persons‟ at different times we are not then burdened – as we are in 
everyday life – by describing persons as a consequence of the history of „their person‟.  
Indeed they have many possible histories of „their persons‟, all of which are rhetorical tools 
for the proactive, instant-by-instant uttering of be-ing.  Bakhtin (1993) wrote that people have 
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no alibi for living.  Persons are accountable to who they are be-ing now, and now, and now.  
The history of their „identity‟ (always assumed to be singular) that they invoke to legitimate 
each instance of be-ing is both the fertile rhetorical field of diction and the sum of their be-
ing at that instant.  If „I‟ say I am a person who completed a PhD. degree in psychology at the 
University of KwaZulu-Natal I do so to make a point now, to legitimate my current be-ing, 
not to arbitrarily reflect a truth about „my‟ existence.  Even if, for example, I am 
autobiographying my academic achievements to a prospective employer I still only mention 
the PhD. in answer to their prospective utterance by creating an identity for myself that I am 
suitably qualified.  Persons are rhetorically positioned – how they are positioned is part of 
their identity.  Each time they utter in a new position the „person‟ is a new person. 
 
Point four.  Things do not have meaning „because they do‟, of and in themselves, but rather 
they have meaning because we say they do.  Following on from point three, things have a 
particular meaning only in that instance in which this meaning is made theirs.  This thought is 
central to the understanding of intentionality (see Shweder, 1990; 1991).  It goes further that 
meaning can only be made in the intentional world.  This world mediates meaning through its 
necessary internal coherence that has built up over eons of intentional human uttering.  
Mediation in this sense is defined by the changing of an acts‟ outcomes by scaffolding or 
funneling its possibilities (see Vygotsky, 1964; 1978; 2004 for discussions on the operations 
of mediation).  Meaning is bound to being made in particular, consensually assumed, ways.  
Meaning is mediated by the centripetal force of maintaining meaning; not breaking the 
coherence of past utterances by imaging new ways of be-ing now that would invalidate 
earlier assumptions.  This thesis is challenged by such centripetal forces directly.  I cannot 
wholly define a new way of understanding be-ing without first acknowledging past 
conceptions of be-ing.  Simply stating a new definition would make it non-intelligible as 
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accepting it would seem to invalidate all other conceptions of be-ing and leave all meaning-
created with these conceptions suspicious.  Such suspicion is more dangerous to accept than 
an apparently wild claim about be-ing; hence this thesis would be non-intelligible.  This is 
partly the reason why I am at so much pains to create a logical geneses stories for my 
rhetoric.  Of course, I employ other mediatory tools to legitimate this thesis, such as 
examples, „the revolution in thought story‟ and „showing by doing‟.  I am arguing for a living 
realism of consequence, though not of necessity.  By which I mean that things mean things, 
but that they do have to mean anything. 
 
Point five.  Personhood and meaning is prosaic.  Prosaics “is a form of thinking that presumes 
the importance of the everyday, the ordinary, the „prosaic‟” (Bakhtin, 1990b, p. 15).  Prosaics 
is based on both a belief in the efficacy of the ordinary and a suspicion of systems.  It is a 
philosophy that life is incrementally created in each momentary and everyday event (Bakhtin 
(1990b, refers to this as the architectonics of life), rather than through the power of „critical 
moments‟.  A belief in critical moments is “like assuming that it may harm a watch to be 
struck against a stone, but that a little dirt introduced into it cannot be harmful” (Tolstoy, 
1875, in Bakhtin, 1990b, p. 23).  Every moment is thus held ethically accountable for the 
influence it has.  Every assumption and meaning that is created and permitted is important in 
constructing life.  The particular position in the temporal, spatial envelope that an utterance 
occupies is essential toward the narrative that is formed, and to what particular interactions 
between persons that are possible.  What is most defining of a person at a particular utterance 
is of no necessity the most sensational, biography-book moment, but rather that which 
greatest serves the intelligibility and rhetorical import of that utterance.  Indeed, the 
biography-book moments only become so through their popular invocation, not for their 
inherent endowment with import – see point four.  Prosaics is an understanding of meaning-
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creating.  The mundane placement of sentence before.  Or after a pause, fundamentally 
changes its meaning.  Intentional worlds are utterly responsive to the consensus/non-
challenged meanings of utterances.  Intentional worlds are built upon incremental 
calcifications of meanings, compressed and hardened by centripetal pressures, affecting 
functioning like Tolstoy‟s grains of dirt.  Prosaics is also a method of expanding on these 
possible narratives through acknowledging the unfinalizability and multiplicity of every 
meaning.  To realise that the final word is yet to be spoken (see Bakhtin, 1984a), and to give 
primacy to the importance of little utterances, now, is to discover the generative capacity of 
be-ing.  It also affirms the accountability an utterer has: No other will ever occupy their 
particular space in life so they have no alibi for be-ing (Bakhtin, 1993).  Prosaics is not only 
knowing that what has been done can be changed – see point four – but that what is to be 
done is of utter, incremental importance and that be-ing begins now.  Prosaics is a study of 
be-ing in/as becoming.  For these reasons I contend that prosaics is an answering tool in 
studying meaning creating. 
 
Not all of these points convince me every time I read them.  This does not mean I am not 
convinced that they are essential to the progression of social science.  Prosaic intertexting is a 
tool to achieve this progression.  Prosaic intertexting allows social scientists the opportunity 
to create the meaning of social science in new ways.  Persons and meaning (the ambit of 
social science) have no essential truths.  But, social scientists have no excuse for the 







What is the influence of Bakhtin in the diction of ‘be-ing’? 
 
To create social science alternatively, as with all things, it is necessary to speak of it in a new 
language.  The words of this new language cannot be abstract from existing diction, but must 
be novel such that the utterances must at once seem familiar and new.  One intellectual who 
provides possible new diction for this purpose is Mikhail Bakhtin.  This essay expounds on 
Bakhtin‟s most useful words-to-create-meaning, as well as reviewing some of the social 
scientific uses this diction is being put to.  Much of Bakhtin‟s words, as instantiated and re-
invented in this thesis, are the diction that legitimates prosaic intertexting as a social scientific 
language.  The rhetorical aim of this is to convince the reader that this language for 
describing the world is valid, even if it is not to the exclusion of other, existing social 
scientific languages.  The essay is a compilation, not a list, of Bakhtin‟s most useful words.  
The reader is provided with an „in‟ into the genesis of words such as „answerability‟ and 
„ventriloque of super-addressees‟.  It is also an opportunity to pay necessary homage to an 
intellectual to whom I am much indebted. 
 
The humble appropriator of ideas: Bakhtin‟s words are available to western academia in 
different epochs of exposé.  This is due to the particular social setting in which and for which 
he wrote, and due to the particular social setting in which and for which his works have been 
„discovered‟ and translated.  Several marked influences on his life and works (see Clark & 
Holquist, 1984) include early 1920s revolutionary Russia, Marxism, ill health, the so-called 
Bakhtin circle of diverse scholars and their regular meetings, academic stigmatization, 
orthodox Christianity in socialist Russia, internal exile, German neo-Kantian philosophy, and 
Dostoevskian writing.  Indeed, Bakhtin‟s earliest words are those of a literary critic, and he is 
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true to this genesis, though he both draws on, and is applied to, a broad range of modern 
„disciplines‟.   
 
This disciplinary eclecticism, the way Bakhtin proudly wrote the same idea using different 
words, and the reality that much of his words are written and translated with chronospatially 
different academic histories, has lead to differing, even apposing, use (appropriation) of 
Bakhtinian ideas.  The modern rubric of Bakhtinian-related work is captured by the terms 
„Dialogism‟ (see Grillo, 2005; Holquist, 1990), „Dialogical‟ (see Mkhize, 2003; Saville, 
2001) and „Narrative‟ (see McAdams, 2006).  Hermans and Dimaggio (2004) use Bakhtinian 
words to describe and construct a hermeneutics of the self as a conflux of inner voices.  This 
appropriation has gained academic prominence and has been linked with pragmatism (see 
Colapietro, 2006; Leary, 2006; Lysaker, 2006; Wiley, 2006), developmental psychology (see 
Bertau, 2007; Garvey & Fogel, 2007; Gratier & Trevarthen, 2007; Linell, 2007; Lyra, 2007) 
and models of self (see Cunha; 2007; Ruck & Slunecko, 2008; Valsiner, 2007).  
Alternatively, Bernard-Donals (1994) illustrates how Bakhtinian words can be used to 
advance Marxist theory of society in need of, but opposing, revolution.  In a different context 
Mkhize (2003; 2004) uses Bakhtinian words to expound upon „African psychology‟ and 
render it intelligible to western academia and Chaudhary (2008) and Choi and Han (2008) 
perform similar cultural appropriations.  Hirschkop and Shepherd (2001) and Valsiner and 
Han (2008) appropriate Bakhtin as a cultural theorist.  Each appropriation privileges that 
which is rhetorically most useful to their utterances.  This essay is a further appropriation – 
the chosen label evidences its alternateness from the others (prosaic intertexting) – and as 




In this essay it is argued that the initial idea that motivates Bakhtin‟s work is arguing against 
formalism (see Erlich, 1980; Ladislav & Pomorska, 1978; Pomorska, 1968; Steiner, 1984), 
firstly in literature (see Bakhtin, 1984a; 1987; 1990a), but secondly, in life (see Bakhtin, 
1981; 1990b; 1993).  This seed sprouts both roots (necessary precepts without which his 
claims would be un-grounded) and branches (applications into new spaces).  It is these roots 
and branches that are Bakhtin‟s diction, distinct, but inseparable from each other.  The words-
to-create-meaning he invented were invented as he pushed his arguing against formalism into 
the earthen sod of uttered utterances, and the deafening openness of possible utterances: 
 
Utterance A: „The distinction of life is be-ing, and it is beautiful‟.  Huh?  What does this 
mean?  This essay contends that this utterance gives a guide to rendering Bakhtin‟s words 
intelligible as useful, indeed critical, to social science. The utterance is intelligible only as a 
part of the answering and the calls to answer (the roots and branches) that are presented 
below. 
 
A root: Beauty and truth are better enunciated in prosaics than in poetics.  The Russian 
formalists (see Ladislav & Pomorska, 1978; Pomorska, 1968) and Sausaurian linguists (see 
Koerner, 1973) privileged form, underlying structures, above what they viewed as imperfect, 
everyday instantiations of the true.  Furthermore, „form‟ is held to be the truest arbiter of 
meaning.  Bakhtin (1990b) labeled this view „Poetics‟ as he denounced the sentiment that the 
rhyming couplets of a sonnet are more beautiful by this virtue than an inarticulate stammer of 
love professed by a bumbling teen-ager.  In contrast to poetics, Bakhtin advances the 
importance and aesthetic virtue of „prosaics‟.  Prosaics is a word that facilitates utterances on 
be-ing – that everyday, incrementally experienced process – as opposed to a life – a narrative 
of critical moments.  Bakhtin extends what is initially a counter-idea to formalism to begin to 
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exalt the base elements of human living in his works on Rebelais (1984b; 1990b).  Modern 
theorists (Freeman, 2006; Hermans, 2004; 2006; Hermans & Hermans-Jansen, 1995) have 
appropriated prosaics as a hermeneutic legitimization, focusing on the experiential (and un-
mediated by social/structural/linguistic norms) „truths‟ of living.  This thesis appropriates 
prosaics as giving grounds to study all human be-ing as act-utterances and that each of these 
act-utterances is equal in potential meaning. 
 
Another root: To be is to struggle with two opposing forces, to lack agency or to have no 
meaning-creating boundaries is to have lost the struggle.  Bakhtin (1990b) argues that an 
utterance must negotiate both centripetal and centrifugal forces of language.  The two 
oppositional forces are similar to essentialism and relativism respectively.  Imagine the 
meaning of an utterance as existing in a whirlpool.  Centripetal forces draw the meaning of 
the utterance down to the centre, depositing it as a finalized, indisputable reality in the mud of 
the meaning bed.  Centrifugal forces push the meaning of the utterance out of the flow, 
excising it as part of the whirlpool as an incoherent in-essence.  For example, what does 
„today is cold‟ mean?  Centripetally it may be analyzed as a statement about the objective 
temperature to the exclusion of another analysis that the day is emotionally foreboding.  In 
the future „today is cold‟ can only be a statement of atmospheric temperature and any other 
meaning is wrong.  Centrifugally though it may be a  mechanism for a speaker to stimulate 
conversation, or a statement of relative (not objective) temperature, or an excuse for not 
doing chores in the garden, or or or.  Bakhtin (1990b) considered that centripetal forces 
dominated Russian formalist thinking and that the quest for specifying the meaning of an 
utterance calcifies the utterance and inhibits its creative use.  Conversely Bakhtin (1990b) 
championed centrifugal force in uttering, advocating the generative power of language to 
facilitate new utterances.  For Bakhtin centripetal and centrifugal forces impose structure in 
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an essential lack of order.  This thesis appropriates the diction by emphasizing that the 
utterance is only comprehensible as the whole of the whirlpool.  Each utterance is both 
centripetal and centrifugal.  Be-ing is beautiful in answering and as defined.  Indeed, be-ing is 
at once defined and open. 
 
Another root: The final word is yet unspoken.  Meaning can never be fixed.  All utterances 
can yet be differently through future differential intelligibility renderings.  While Bakhtin 
(1990b) writes about centripetal forces operating in language and be-ing to speak the final 
word, he remains adamant that the final word will not be spoken (1990b; 1993).  In this 
rendering an utterance may be finalized each time it is used, but it always remains open and 
unfinal in answering.  For example, „a library‟ is a place full of books, though in the future „a 
library‟ may be a place devoid of books and full of computers.  The unfinality of an utterance 
is easily mistaken to be perspectival.  In Bakhtin‟s (1990b; 1993) use it is the utterance itself 
that is unfinal, not a person‟s perspective of it.  Indeed, the utterance does not exist except 
insofar as it is perspective, and it is only an uttered perspective that any two utterances are 
ever „really‟ the same.  In this thesis finalization is appropriated to argue that the aim of 
social science should not be to reduce everyday prose-utterances to an instantiation of a 
super-class of utterances except insofar as doing so is facilitative to the explanative utterance 
of the social science.  For example, a person hitting another person is not an act of violence in 
social science, rather it is described by social science as an act of violence so that the social 
scientist can legitimately inform the social regulation of particular acts.  While this thesis has 
ontologically relativist precepts, unfinality is the mechanism by which the „X means anything 
therefore X means nothing‟ trap can be escaped, for “though an entire life cannot be 
consummated, individual moments can, and the cognitive-ethical understanding of these 
moments is subordinated to the aesthetic consummation at that moment” (Bernard-Donals, 
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1994).  This principle is captured by the model of prosaic intertexting insofar as the purposed 
of prosaic intertexting is to generate new meanings.  The mechanism for achieving this 
creation is the generation of alternative and positioned a/a complexes, answerings and 
addressings.   
 
Another root: An utterance speaks in many voices.  Bakhtin (1990b) argues that characters 
speak into many voices and that in uttering the character embodies many voices (see 
Bamberg & Zielke, 2007; Cunha, 2007).  The words Bakhtin uses for this are, alternatively, 
polyphony (1981; 1990a) or heteroglossia (1990b).  The utterance is no single thing, but is 
inexorably tied to the utterances that precede it, and the utterances that may yet be.  For 
example, a white boy greeting a black man in South Africa „Sawubona‟ does not just carry 
the child‟s voice.  The voices of contemporary social etiquette, of the child‟s mother 
advocating racial tolerance in post-apartheid South Africa, of the child seeking to be praised 
as out-going, and so on, are also uttered.  One of the ways an utterance is unfinal is that a 
different voice may always yet speak through it.  Sakellaroupoulo and Baldwin (2006a) have 
appropriated heteroglossia/polyphony as a model of self in internal conversation.  This is 
extended to include discussions on how one voice achieves primacy and is actually uttered 
(see Sakellaroupoulo & Baldwin, 2006b; Stemplewska-Zakowicz, Walecka & Gabinska, 
2006), whether and how inter-conversations precede or are learnt from interpersonal 
conversations (see Susswein, Bibok & Carpendale, 2007), and of the value of this model for 
psychotherapy (see Marioka, 2008).  Mkhize (2004) has used this aspect of the dialogic 
rubric to extrapolate traditional African psychologies of self.  In this thesis 
heteroglossia/polyphony is appropriated as an element of the „a/a complex‟.  It is argued that 
giving written space to the „other voices‟ of an utterance is key to any rendering of its 
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intelligibility.  Indeed, the utterance is only insofar as the voices that it answers and calls 
upon for answering. 
 
A branch: An utterance cannot be without that which precedes it and that which it precedes.  
An utterance has no meaning except insofar as it is part of a process, except its process is 
really its substantiation.  “Being is not something static, set over against the activity of 
thought; it exists only in a process of becoming which is intrinsically related to its activity” 
(Bakhtin, 1984a,  p. 304).  For example, „I do‟ is unintelligible except insofar as it is a change 
from „I don‟t‟ and it is beholden to „I will‟.  All utterances are siblings, children and parents, 
as well as parents and children.  Bakhtin (1990a; 1993) invents „process‟ as a consequent 
intelligibility necessity to „Utterance A‟, just as „Utterance A‟ is a consequent intelligibility 
necessity to the utterance as prosaic, force-filled, unfinal and multi-voiced.  But, in rendering 
„Utterance A‟ intelligible this consequent word is as important as the historical „antecedents‟ 
above.  The tree has both roots and branches in order for it to be a tree.  Mkhize (2004) has 
appropriated process as similar to the process of self-development embodied in many African 
spiritualist beliefs.  For example, the belief that persons continue to exist after their death 
among us is supported by the idea that these persons have continued their journey of 
personhood to another plane.  This open-ended nature of be-ing is supported by other factors, 
including the cosmology and the language (isiZulu) itself.  This is supported by ceremonies 
of coming-of-age at various „stages of personhood‟, from before birth to after death.  In this 
thesis „process‟ is appropriated less as a stage-like progression of be-ing (as this implies 
continuity existing beyond the be-ing being uttered as continuous) and more as an answer to 
how continuity can be imposed in a multi-voiced, essentially-without-structure-or-meaning 
utterance.  While the roots create questions toward which „Utterance A‟ is the answer, the 




Another branch: All utterances are both answers and entreaties to answer.  When an utterance 
is uttered it is in answer to other utterances and it calls forth other utterances to answer it; the 
uttered is both addressed and addressive.  Answerability and addressivity are key to rendering 
an utterance intelligible relative to other utterances.  Inasmuch as process is a descriptive 
word of the manner in which utterances are all related, answerability is a descriptive word of 
the mechanism by which they relate.  All utterances are linked in a process-of-be-ing pattern, 
answerability and addressivity describe how persons create, sustain and recognise the 
patterns.  The utterances that a particular utterance is answerable to or addressive of do not 
need to be explicitly voiced by a person-act/utterance.  Rather, each utterance exists in a tacit, 
in potentia, „a/a complex‟.  The explicit voicing of particular elements of this a/a complex is a 
rhetorical act of positioned intelligibility rendering by the subsequent utterer.  For example, a 
person says: „Ag, my day was fine, I‟m quite tired‟, what does this mean, or rather, how does 
one respond?  Some utterances invoked in the a/a complex are oppositional: „I don‟t really 
want to talk about our day, I want to talk about that money you spent on the car‟ and „I really 
need you to support me right now by showing you care and are really interested in what I do‟.  
The answer is a choice, but a choice is invoked.  An „utterance‟ without an a/a complex is 
unintelligible.  Bakhtin (1990a) creates answerability and addressivity in conjunction with 
process and in answer to the perceived threat to „Utterance A‟ that accepting „Utterance A‟ 
leaves us no way of understanding be-ing is either distinctive or beautiful.  This thesis uses 
answerability and addressivity as a the blue-print for a methodological tool for unpacking 
meaning creating. 
 
Another branch: A person has no alibi for be-ing.  There is no a priori, intrinsic meaning or 
reason to be-ing, only that which is uttered as meaningful.  The “act is truly real (it 
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participates in once-occurrent Being-as-event) only in its entirety.  Only this whole act is 
alive, exists fully and inescapably – comes to be, is accomplished” (Bakhtin, 1993, p. 2).  The 
„Being-as-event‟ of Bakhtin (1990a; 1990b; 1993) is a once-off, unique and ir-replicable 
moment of be-ing that constitutes an instant of personhood.  Each utterance of be-ing is final 
and complete in the instant of its utterance.  For example, each oscillation of a hand as it 
waves goodbye is qualitatively different from the previous as each successive iteration carries 
the history of increasing numbers of earlier oscillations.  Each oscillation is equal to the 
others only insofar as it is uttered as identical, repetitive elements of the wave-whole, each 
oscillation is unequal to others as an event of be-ing.  For this reason each utterance has no 
„alibi‟, it cannot be excused from the place it occupies and it is the only validity of that 
instant of „Being-as-event‟.  Hermans and Dimaggio (2004) and Hermans and Hermans-
Jansen (1995) have appropriated this as a philosophical argument for phenomenology, in that 
each phenomenum of „Being-as-event‟ is only intelligible as a whole and part of that whole is 
the experience of it as a whole.  This experience is taken to be only accessible to the 
utterer/actor.  By supplanting individual experience with inter-personal meaning creating the 
„no alibi‟ argument also supports inter-subjectivity (see Bakhtin, 1990b; 1993).  This thesis 
appropriates the „no alibi‟ argument as an excuse for social science to analyze utterances both 
as wholes (a/a complex inclusive as it must be) and as instants of „Being-as-event‟ in 
patterns.  That an event of be-ing is only whole in the instant of utterance is problematic to 
social science description; the event is inaccessible.  Bakhtin‟s own writing followed 
phenomenological philosophy, to privilege the be-er and this causes much tension in the 
coherence of his writing.  In this thesis Bakhtin‟s conclusions are rejected.  Rather, „no alibi‟ 
is applied as a justification for positioned (rhetorical) research so that while the rendering of 
an utterance intelligible through science is acknowledged to differ from its „Being-as-event‟ 
the direction of the appropriation is explicit.  While it is impossible for this thesis to use 
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Bakhtin‟s words exactly as he first uttered them, it can explicitly use them to achieve a 
hopeful revolution in methodology. 
 
Another branch: The multiplicity of voices in and for an utterance are enunciated through 
language/act norms.  No word is without history.  By consensus some modes of grouping 
words are formalized as structured languages, others as linguistic norms or slang and yet 
others as representative of instantiations of particular ideologies or super-addressees.  These 
formalizations or norm-recognizable „languages‟ are uttered as if they have a voice of their 
own.  When an utterance is made that gains rhetorical force from the language/linguistic 
norms or super-addressee it can be said that the utterance is ventriloque-ing.  For example, a 
girl tells her boy companion that sex before marriage is immoral.  This is not merely her 
opinion, but rather it ventriloques a long tradition of conservative religious prescription.  The 
boy cannot respond by saying „sex before marriage is not immoral‟ without also addressing 
how the faith can say it is so.  Bakhtin (1987) groups different „languages‟ or „ventriloque 
voices‟ into speech genres.  Speech genres mediate what/how things can be said.  But, a 
speech genre is created in the act of ventriloque.  In this thesis „speech genre‟ is appropriated 
as „utterance genre‟, away from „only-the-spoken‟ to act-utterances.  A non-verbal utterance 
can ventriloque as well as a verbal one.  For example, getting down on one‟s knee and 
extending one‟s arms upward while holding a diamond and gold ring ventriloques a long 
tradition of gender roles and „coupling‟ as well as speaking „will you marry me‟.  Speech 
genres and ventriloque are the basis for constructing an a/a complex when it is implicit.  
Speech genres are archetypes for what is answered and what is addressed.  And the 




Bakhtin has supplied us with works for speaking about persons and our world in a way that 
relavitism may be meaningful, where persons are meaningfully independent and where there 
is hope of change by using that definitive human characteristic; creativity.  This essay has 
appropriated Bakhtin‟s words to these rhetorical aims.  The words Bakthin created have been 
arranged in this essay as if Bakhtin had a single, consistent utterance.  I will use Bakhtin‟s 
words (in Chapter 4) to create an explication of the model of prosaic intertexting in action.  
This is not the only way his words are intelligible, however, in claiming to deliver a new 
social scientific methodology, it is necessary to speak with new but intelligible words as if 
they are coherent.  The words of this thesis are the words of Bakhtin as appropriated here, but 
in this utterance-a/a-complex comparative, evolutionary and developmental psychology, 
interpretative philosophy, rhetoric, social critique and African spirituality also voice.  
Bakhtin‟s be-ing is at once a theory of self, an ethics of value and, here, an analytic model for 










































Chapter 4: The research prosaic in action 
 
The conventional role of a „literature review‟ section in a thesis is to identify the gaps in our 
knowledge and locate the thesis as plugging one of those gaps.  In this thesis I argue that we 
are not seeing the gaps because it is filled with little disciplinary pieces and our focus is too 
narrow.  Social science has been an act of meaning finding or meaning fixing, but it should 
be an act of meaning creating, with rhetorical aims.  The aim of chapter 3 was to provide 
„roots‟ and describe the „soil‟ in which the prosaic intertexting model grows, such that the 
explicit speech-act of chapter 2 has historical value.  The aim of chapter 4 is to explicate the 
creation of the model (describing the „wood‟ of the tree) and how it may be used (testing it in 
the wind). 
 
Section A: Data in theory 
 
According to the rhetoric of prosaic intertexting anything that is human/personal/social 
should be analyzable as an utterance.  This is regardless of the form, size or content.  Prosaic 
intertexting is a methodology proposed to enable researchers to utter new things about human 
be-ing, not bits of human be-ing.  The act of rendering something intelligible is accomplished 
through rhetorical re-creation of the utterance as a thing that is intelligible, changing the 
utterance itself by changing its a/a complex.  A rendering of intelligibility is not an act of 
exposition of meaning; it is an act of imposition of meaning.   
 
All human utterances are „data in theory‟.  Traditionally data have been sub-divided by type 
according to the form it is observed as.  For example, naturally observed, textual, visual or 
clinical.  These sub-divisions coincide with the primary sensing of the data, not with the 
76 
 
usefulness of the particular framing to the analyst.  This is wrong.  An utterance is 
experientially embodied and whole.  For example, „naturally occurring talk‟ is not just words 
that may be transcribed, but are words that are spoken and are spatially and in-relationally 
meaningful.  Data should be analyzed in the form(s) that best represent the rhetorical aims of 
the analyst.  Traditional social science has focused on data that is re-viewable – recorded 
voice, written thoughts and video-taped movement.  This thesis argues that the data should be 
what it serves to do.  The acid test for the quality of the data is its illustrative success to the 
addressed person(s) in achieving rhetorical aims. 
 
In this dissertation, letters to the editor of a KwaZulu-Natal newspaper were chosen as data.  
They are directly reported, addressed utterances available in the public domain.  The 
utterances are considered as written speech.  For the illustrative purposes of chapter 4 these 
letters are as good data as any other.  The collection of this data does not impose any burden 
on „research participants‟ (as the data is already in the public domain) and eases the burden of 
work suitable for a masters-level dissertation. 
 
Section B: The ‘data’ sources 
 
„The Daily News‟ (65 editions) was collected via mail delivery from June till August 2007.  
The newspaper claims (The Daily News, 2009a) total readership of 309 000 people, all within 
KwaZulu-Natal province and 81% within Durban.  Readership is 52% „Indian and Coloured‟, 
29% „White‟ and 19% „African‟ (The Daily News, 2009a).  54% of readership is men and 
46% women (The Daily News, 2009a).  55% of readership is over the age of 35 years old and 
45% between the ages of 16 and 34 years old (The Daily News, 2009a).  Each edition carries 
a median number of „letters to the editor‟ of 4 (rounded to a whole number).  Each letter to 
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the editor is an average length (calculated by randomly sampling 15% of letters and counting 
manually) of 168 words (rounded to a whole number).  Letters are posted on a single page 
and form part of the „opinion‟ sub-section of the newspaper.  The newspaper was selected as 
it has relatively short letters to the editor, is readily available where the researcher lives, is 
relatively cheap and is available on a daily basis. 
 
All „letters to the editor‟ were coded by date published and topic addressed.  The extended 
time period of data collection allows letters that refer to previous articles or letters published 
in the time period to be seriated as part of the analysis.  All data were collected and stored as 
hard-copies.  Replications quoted as „utterance-seeds‟ are all direct quotes, though the a/a 
complexes of the utterance-trees are invented unless otherwise stated.  
 
The collection and analysis of this data is done with the approval of the UKZN Humanities 
Ethics Committee and all use of the data is in accordance with the terms and conditions of 
„The Daily News‟ (The Daily News, 2009b).  „Letters to the editor‟ are data in the public 
domain, though all names should be treated as pseudonyms. 
 
Section C: A data driven refrain 
 
Prosaic intertexting, a model of social scientific enquiry – how beautiful.  So what does one 
do with it exactly?  Chapter 4 is a presentation of the model as applied in 9 analytics.  These 
analytics are in answering to the model.  The purpose of each analytic is to illustrate a 
potential use for prosaic intertexting in meaning creation.  The use of prosaic intertexting is 
an act of meaning creation.  Or rather, it is an act of attempted meaning creation.  The act is 
un-consummated until it is „heard‟ by an addressee.  In the case of this thesis you are the 
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addressee.  With this qualifier (and as part of the rhetoric of the thesis), I ask you now to read 
the analytics not as „results‟ but as a discussion, and not of themselves but as the part of the 
whole utterance (thesis) they are.  The analytics are attempts to achieve something for the 
thesis, that something is „utility‟. 
 
Creating an utterance around all that is voiced. 
 
The „prosaic intertexting 101‟ lecturer: How do explicit speech-acts (usually called „data‟ in 
conventional social science) fit into the prosaic intertexting model?  This analytic introduces 
the analysis process of prosaic intertexting with an explicit speech-act delimitated by the 
turn-taken by the voicer (Buntu Zuma).  The explicit speech-act is an entire „letter to the 
editor‟, it is not qualified by an editorial interjection, nor is it explicitly in reply to an article 
or letter.  The rhetorical aim of this analytic is to illustrate the operation and functionality of 
prosaic intertexting.  This analytic does not inform as to how the elements of an utterance are 
generated by the social scientist, rather it illustrates what utterance generation looks like.  The 
explicit speech-act is a „letter to the editor‟, the a/a complex, generative answering and 
generative addressings are invented by the social scientist (me). 
 
Exemplar 1: An explicit speech-act on 29
th
 July 2008 
“How could a man be left to die? | What has our country come to when a man lies dying on 
the pavement of one of our most populated cities in the country – not covered by an oversized 
overcoat, plastic or blanket – and every passer-by turns a blind eye because they do not 
recognize the face as one known to them? „An injury to one is an injury to all.‟ When is this 
applicable and by who to whom? „Love thy neighbour as you love yourself.‟ To whom is this 
commandment directed? „Injury to one.‟ Who is the one? „Love thy neighbour.‟ Who is 
whose neighbour? A stranger is a friend we‟ve never met and all mankind is God‟s creation. 




If we treat Exemplar 1 as the explicit speech-act around which we will create an utterance 
then it can be graphically illustrated as in Figure 11.  Around this plain vertical line (see p. 8) 
we are going to create an utterance. 
 
Figure 11. A piece of data. 
 
 
In order to place Figure 11 in a context we must create an a/a complex around it.  For 
example, we might define the a/a complex as: „What does Buntu Zuma mean in this letter?  
The analysis is exploratory and „neutral‟, seeking to provide a definitive answer of Buntu‟s 
meaning (singular), as is typical of thematic or content analysis with a qualitative frame.‟  
This a/a complex is graphically represented in Figure 12. 
 




The next step in rendering Exemplar 1 as an utterance is to create things in which it is in 
answer to (generative answerings).  These answerings are illustrate of the open-ended 
potentiality and multiplicity of the utterance – that one‟s position relative to a proposed 
speech-act influences the likely utterance one will create around it.  This can be represented 
by creating Buntu‟s letter as if it is the „next-turn‟ in multiple conversations between Buntu 
and distinct „others‟.  I represent this by stating five „generative answerings‟ (see below), 
each of which has an „author‟ assigned to it.  These authors are invented by me as genre 
archetypes (see p. 13), they are invented, not „real‟ quotes.  The addition of the generative 
answerings is illustrated in Figure 13. 
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Generative answerings 1: 
 Buntu‟s disgust: I walk down that street and would not want to walk past an exposed body. 
 Burke: All that it takes for evil to triumph is for good people to do nothing, what are you 
doing? 
 Buntu‟s fear: Imagine if I were to be knocked over by a car and my body lay on the curb, 
would anyone stop to cover me? 
 Tutu: Be a good citizen, you have fought apartheid to be proudly South African, feel shame 
at your fellow citizens‟ actions. 
 Buntu‟s women friends: Fana, you are a modern man and modern men are caring towards 
the plight of others. 
 




Similarly, an utterance must be addressive of other utterances (and in the model this is 
represented by „generative addressings‟).  Generative addressings can be represented by 
inventing the „next-turn‟ in multiple conversations that are in answer to Buntu‟s letter, for 
example the six generative addressings I invented below.  The addition of addressings are 
also illustrated in Figure 14. 
 
Generative addressings 1: 
 Buntu‟s morality: I will cover any bodies I find on the curb, else I am a hypocrite. 
 Lazy, scared public member: But if I were to stop I might become involved in something 
that is dangerous. 
 Buntu‟s rainbow-nation teacher: Race, culture or creed should be overridden by the 
fundamental unity of humanity. 





 Emigrant relative: I told you South Africa is a bad place to live in. 
 Pastor: Be God-fearing, you never know when you will need His blessing. 
 
 




And that (Figure 14) is the complete utterance, a meaning unit-of-analysis.  But what a 
shallow analysis it is!  Rendering an explicit speech-act into an intelligible utterance is an act 
of choice.  The lack of choice in focusing this a/a complex (see p. 78) leaves the analyst the 
difficult task of imposing meaning without appearing to do so.  The list of possible 
„generatives‟ would be limitless because of the unfinalizability of the utterance (see pp. 66-
67).  This is most akin to a lay-person hearing a strangers‟ statement and not having any 
interest in what they are saying beyond not being confronted by sensory gobble-dee-gook.  
Also, the prima facie „understanding‟ of Buntu‟s letter is so strong because he ventriloques 
religious and moral norms so explicitly (through quotes).  This stifles alternative 
intelligibility renderings and is illustrative of rhetorical force in Buntu‟s letter.   
 
However, we can also consider the same explicit speech-act (Exemplar 1) with a specified 
intelligibility interest in nationalism.  Then we can define the a/a complex as: „How does 
Buntu Zuma‟s letter instantiate contemporary nationalism in South Africa? The analysis is 
coloured by an interest in acts of nationalism/dis-nationalism. The validity of the speech-act 
as nationalist/dis-nationalist is evident in the plausibility of the possible narratives‟.  This a/a 









We are also able to generate alternative – and hopefully more informative – answerings (as 
below).  These four alternative answerings are illustrated in Figure 16 (compare with Figure 
13).  Note too that this dissertation does not address nationalism, this is only an example 
chosen to illustrate a methodological point.  Furthermore, the generatives are in no way 
representative of any measure of „truth‟ or „goodness‟ in and of themselves, rather they serve 
to create explicit speech-acts as contextual and meaningful. 
 
Generative answerings 2: 
 Post-apartheid rhetoritician: South Africa is a special nation because of its history of 
oppression, revolution and conclusion. 
 Buntu: I struggle and I vote for the nation we have now. 
 Anti-apartheid struggler with communal ideology: „An injury to one is an injury to all‟. 
 Buntu‟s mother: South Africa is a Christian nation, following Jesus‟s teaching of „loving 
they neighbour‟. 
 




We also generate alternative addressings following the same process (as below).  These three 





Generative addressings 2: 
 Buntu feeling gratifyingly benevolent: You, who were not part of the struggle against 
apartheid, you are now a South African. 
 Buntu‟s superego: If you do not help fellow citizens, you betray your worth as a citizen. 
 Evasive cynic: But the dead person was probably a foreigner… 
 
 




Is this „grey‟ utterance (Figure 17) essentially better than the one created above (Figure 14)?  
No, what is important is that either option is an equally valid intelligibility rendering or use of 
prosaic intertexting.  The „real‟ meaning of Buntu‟s statement is given by (1) selecting one 
answering and putting it before the explicit speech-act, and (2) selecting one addressing and 
putting it after the speech act, thereby creating a coherent narrative in three parts.  Rather, the 
validity of an utterance rendering is not defined by its reality, but rather by its rhetorical use 
in the narrative construction of the social scientist.  Furthermore, the utterance is a whole, the 
answerings and addressings are both possibilities, not realities, and intelligibility is dependent 
on the explicit and the imposed possibilities, not one to the exclusion of the other. 
 
Creating an utterance of only part of the voicing. 
 
The neo-discourse analyst: The analysis of long segments of speech-acts as an utterance is 
somewhat dry because the utterer has rhetorical space to clarify and impress a particular 
understanding.  Their meaning seems self-evident because of the keen prosaic intertexting 
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sense that makes be-ing meaningful to us all as lay persons.  Oftentimes though it is the social 
scientist‟s task to elucidate meanings from ambiguous or seemingly incomplete utterances.  
This analytic is an illustration of the generative power of utterance rendering by creating 
more/extra narrative possibilities than the lay, „complete‟ and finalized „reality‟ of a 
monophonic speech-act.  A primary prosaic intertexting mechanism for creating alternative 
meanings is by assigning „voices‟ to the generated answerings and addressings.  This analytic 
illustrates the effect of this voice assignation by creating an utterance of a segment of a „letter 
to the editor‟.  
 
Exemplar 2: An explicit speech-act on 6
th
 June 2008 
“Those with better access to education and other resources, the majority of whom are 
fortunately or unfortunately white” 
 
We may define the a/a complex as: „What racist sentiment remains, sanitized but maintained, 
in post-apartheid South Africa? The analytic is coloured by an interest in the mechanisms of 
stereotyping.  The speech-act is treated as if it does rhetorical work and that real themes of 
this rhetorical work can be identified‟.  How can Exemplar 2 be created as an intelligible 
speech-act that maintains and sanitizes race-separating rhetoric?  If it were intelligible in this 
way, what explicit speech-acts would precede it to give it this intelligibility?  Below I 
generate „answerings‟ and „addressings‟ to answer these questions.  Why did I create these 
„generatives‟ and not others?  Not because of a divined/induced reality to the meaning of 
Exemplar 2, but rather to serve my rhetoric, to re-create Exemplar 2 through the „focus‟ of my 
a/a complex.  That I am participant in the creation of the utterance speaks both to the 
rhetorical philosophy of prosaic intertexting, and to the contested space in which meaning is 




Generative answerings 3: 
 Neo-marxist friend: Those with resources are the oppressors of the people. 
 Post-apartheid liberalist historian on TV: Whites took most of the resources for themselves. 
 Writer‟s white friend: Why can your parents not read, didn‟t they go to school? 
 Writer: I deserve more than the little I have. 
 Leading „rainbow nation‟ politician: It is wrong to look with anger at those who did or did 
not have the equal opportunities we all have now. 
 
Generative addressings 3: 
 Writer: Since no blame is laid at whites‟ doorsteps for their „fortunate or unfortunate‟ access 
to particular resources I may now stereotype whites without being racist. 
 White reader: This person is a coward, why can‟t they not just say they think all whites are 
unjustly better off, this is about money, not race. 
 White racist: Typical black person, always simpering, even when crying „injustice‟. 
 Writer‟s friend: Yes, you are correct, it is not right for one person to have much when 
another has nothing, especially not if they are whites, because of history. 
 South African race researcher: Such statements are clear evidence that race and race-politic 
remain both contentious and bitter issues to South Africans. 
 White employer‟s wife: Yes, they are stupid, but their schools are so bad. 
 
The explicit speech-act has been created as an utterance instantiating sanitized but sustained 
racism (see Figure 18).  How is this done?  The a/a complex defines how an explicit speech-
act is to be appropriated as an utterance?  This is true insofar as the a/a complex states the 
outcome through which the explicit speech-act is to be created as an utterance.  It does not 
state „how‟ – the process by which – this outcome is to be achieved though.  The work of 
utterance creation is best exemplified in the generative answerings and addressings.  In 7 of 
the 11 generatives explicit reference is made to a racial category, while 2 make explicit 
reference to „race‟ or the (racially) „rainbow nation‟.  The other 2 generatives both refer to the 
station of a person in society.  In South Africa, the station of the person in society is 
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centripetally tied to race.  By populating the a/a complex with race-referent voices/texts the 
explicit speech-act itself becomes a race-referent utterance.  The creation of the explicit 
speech-act as an utterance of racist instantiation is akin to coding a theme.  However, the act 
is not one of documenting what is, rather it is an act of rhetoric. 
 




How do we judge whether the construction is „good‟/„valid‟ or not?  One answer would be to 
find corroborating evidence from the body of the „original author‟.  For example, to see what 
they said before and after this statement.  While this may appear, prima facie, to be plausible 
it is difficult for you as the reader of this thesis to do.  Why?  You have witnessed the explicit 
speech-act as an utterance, I have imposed meaning on it.  Any re-imposition of meaning on 
it by you is now answerable to my utterance construction.  You must now see the explicit 
speech as either „yes, really a race-related instantiation‟ or „no, not related to race at all‟.  
What you cannot do is see the explicit speech-act as it was originally uttered by the „original 
author‟.  This is the full letter to the editor: 
 
Exemplar 3: An explicit speech-act on 6
th
 June 2008 
“Judge issue is about resistance to change | Funny how quickly South Africans come together 
whenever there is a complaint or a march about animal, women and child protection/rights 
issues. As a rainbow nation we cry with one voice about crime, xenophobia and other social 
ills. But whenever we talk about transformation in this country, all sorts of finger-pointing 
takes place with black and white people. Those with better access to education and other 
resources, the majority of whom are fortunately or unfortunately white, have in one way or 
the other, benefited from the inhuman apartheid government. These are the ones who are now 
most vocal and committed in their course of undermining the government of the day. 
Unfortunately for them, there is nothing that will stop change and transformation in South 
Africa. The issues of the judge president of Cape Town,  Judge John Hlophe, has nothing to 
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do with all we are told it has to do with, but it has everything to do with what I have 
highlighted above – resistance to change. THULANI SISULU, University of Zululand” 
 
What meaning do we impose?  Where does this section fit in to the analytic presented here?  I 
argue that it is either (a) a new, un-related explicit speech-act, or (b) an addressing to add to 
the answerability complex of the race-related utterance constructed above.  In option „b‟ this 
explicit speech-act does not discount any of the invented answerings and addressings posited 
by me.  Rather, it is an additional explication of the multitudinous possible texts that are not 
made explicit in the answerability complex.  This can be graphically illustrated in Figure 19 
where the thicker answering line in the top hemisphere represents option „b‟.  The 
explication/invention of a particular answering/addressing is valid not by virtue of its „truth‟ 
to the original explicit speech act.  Rather the validity of a particular answering/addressing is 
a function of its rhetorical utility to create an intelligible utterance as used by the social 
scientist.  The judgement of this utility is always the addressee/answerer of the social scientist 
(in this case: you). 
 




This analytic is illustrative of the process of creating wholeness to an utterance in the face of 
ambiguity.  It also tells a story about how that wholeness is judged.  If so much license is 
given to social scientists to create meaning, do we not run the risk of conveying undue power 
to the social scientist?  I argue that the social scientist already holds such power, but that we 
are not, in the contemporary, compelled to take responsibility for the power of meaning-
creation (see Hood, Mayall & Oliver, 1999).  Rather, we are able to hide behind the 
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ventriloqued voice of science-as-objective.  Does it mean that because the social scientist 
creates meaning that that meaning is not useful to anyone but the social scientist, or to 
nothing beyond social science?  No, social science is the act of creating new diction with 
which the world can be re-created.  In rendering the explicit speech-act as a race-related 
utterance the social scientist is creating space in which to discuss what is un-voiced.  This 
gives us power to re-create and change.  Siyabonga Seme can now talk as a writer motivated 
by the personal experience of denigration because his parents are illiterate, not only/just 
through the „official line‟ of a young black intellectual dissatisfied by the duplicity of whites 
and their resistance to change. 
 
Creating meaning by positioning addressees. 
 
The positioning theorist: In reading the letters to the editor I came across the one below.  It 
does not refer to any previous article published in the Daily News, nor could I find one in a 
cursory search through the newspaper editions collected as part of the „data set‟.  So what 
does it mean?  This analytic will illustrate the function of addressees for rendering an explicit 
speech-act as an intelligible utterance.  The analytic is generative of the multiplicity of 
possible addressees for the explicit speech-act.  This creates the utterance as social scientific 
model of the power of addressivity to generate multiple meanings, no effort is made to give a 
specific, non-model related meaning to the explicit speech-act; doing so involves an 
alternative utterance rendering. 
 
Exemplar 4: An explicit speech-act on 22
nd
 July 2008 
“Vetch‟s Pier was for Indian fishermen | Many years ago the purpose of Vetch‟s Pier was to 
provide Indian fishermen who used seine nets with a safe way of launching their boats from 
the beach to catch fish. A seine is a net which hangs vertically in the water with weights at 
the bottom edge. The ends are drawn together to catch fish by encircling them. The seine 
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netters lived in tin shacks above the beach. Two boats were used to take a large net in two 
halves out beyond the breaking waves. The seine netters would row out in the middle of an 
opening between Vetch‟s and North Pier. Each boat would drop the mid-section of their nets 
into the sea while holding on to the end of their ropes. Vetch‟s Pier was one of the few places 
where people could buy fish as the boats were brought in to shore. The fish were literally 
jumping off the boats. Back then, a normal size fish cost a mere shilling (20 cents) while a 
larger fish cost only two shillings (40 cents). RA WIID, Durban” 
 
I am interested in illustrating the importance of addressivity in utterance creation, so the a/a 
complex is defined to meet this end: „How can I use RA Wiid‟s letter to illustrate the 
importance of addressings in utterance creation?  The analytic is coloured by an interest in 
the legitimacy of addressee generation.  The explicit speech-act is treated as having no „real‟ 
addressee so that this does not inhibit the validity of the illustrating, invented addressees‟. 
 
Who is R A Wiid writing to?  Rather, how can I impose who is addressed by R A Wiid to 
best illustrate the potential diversity of utterances that are possible from a singular explicit 
speech-act?  The addressings generated in this analytic are created to illustrate diversity.  This 
is in contrast with  the addressings generated in Figure 18 that are created to frame the 
utterance in a particular substantive context.  An alternative way to capture this is to say that 
Generative addressings 4 is substantively framed by non-specificity, that there is an 
„indefinite audience‟ (see Bakhtin, 1990a; 1990b).  Figure 20 is a graphical illustration of this 
that shows the potential to multitudinously populated the a/a complex. 
 
Generative addressings 4: 
 Durban history specialist: Thank-you RA Wiid, we have been wondering what the point of 
Vetch‟s was for a while now. 
 RA Wiid‟s child: Really, and what is that thing over there for, the one with the flashing 
light on top? 
 Indian fisherman: Yes, why can we not still use Vetch‟s Pier, it was ours, why are we 
prohibited from fishing there now? 
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 Surfer: Ok, whatever, now Vetch‟s is used to launch surfers, not fishing boats, times 
change. 
 Eco-activist: And now the entire eco-system around the pier is denuded because the seine 
nets catch indiscriminately between size and species of marine life. 
 Old-age pensioner: Times were easier back then, more carefree; I wish I could go back. 
 Another old-age pensioner: Democratic South Africa is a new and better world for me and 
my people, no longer are we forced to live in tin shacks and scratch a meagre living from 
the sea. 
 City and beach developer: Fishermen no longer use Vetch‟s Pier to stay alive, it is 
unnecessary and ugly, let us tear it down and re-build it better. 
 Pan-africanist fundamentalist: You see, the Indians even had their own piers where they 
could fish, no, we as true Africans are the only ones who are really oppressed, and we still 
are. 
 Captain of a beach-volleyball team: You see ladies, it takes cooperation to catch the fish, to 
win the prize, so stop bickering and let‟s do this thing. 
 
 




I stop, arbitrarily, at 10 generative addressings.  The explicit speech-act has many possible 
addressees.  In generating addressings I used parts of the text as inspiration.  However, the 
utterance is a whole and not addressive of any one of these parts in and of itself.  I have 
created the utterance as addressive of an example of multiplicity of meaning and 
unfinalisation.  Answering and addressing generation is an act of situating the explicit 
speech-act in an imaginary dialogue.  This analytic has illustrated meaning creating by 
„addressing‟ generation.  Answering generation is congruent to this.  Prosaic intertexing is a 
method of „dialoguing‟ by inserting explicit speech-acts into the prosaic world of contested 
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possibles such that texts/narratives may be formed.  Social science is an act of meaning 
making and prosaic intertexting is a tool in fulfilling this act.  Social science using prosaic 
intertexing is creative, generative and unfinalizing. 
 
Creating a singular voice from polyphonic data. 
 
The minority/majority influence theorist: Polyphony is the property of utterances in that they 
answer and address a multiplicity of voices.  This does not mean that the explicit speech-act 
„author‟ is a group of authors.  Indeed, even when a group of people are cited as a combined 
author (even when it is them doing the citing) this is not an instance of polyphony.  Only 
utterances may be polyphonic, explicit speech-acts are un-living and voiceless until they are 
rendered intelligible as an utterance.  This analytic illustrates the process of generating 
polyphony in utterance rendering.  In creating an utterance it feigns „de-constructing‟ an 
explicit speech-act into its alleged constituent voices. 
 
Exemplar 4: An explicit speech-act on 1
st
 July 2008 
“Please fix and tar our Suntown road | The residents of Suntown have been promised for 
more than 10 years an upgrade on dirt roads, street lighting and the cutting of grass. After 
numerous complaints by the residents about four years ago extensive drainage work was 
carried out. However the drainage system is now blocked because of a lack of maintenance. 
The road work has stopped. This potholed dirt road is destroying our cars and houses 
alongside the road are severely affected by dust. The road is also used as a bypass by 
hundreds of cars and trucks whenever the N3 freeway is blocked. Mr Sutcliffe, give this road 
a proper name because it is not on any Metro map and tar it so the ratepayers of Suntown can 
also applaud the work you do for residents in other areas. CONCERNED RATEPAYERS, 
Suntown” 
 
The purpose of this analytic is to illustrate polyphony, so the a/a complex must be defined in 
terms of a polyphonic space: „How can I illustrate polyphony in an utterance? The analytic is 
coloured by an interest in voice-identifiers as illustrating polyphony. The explicit speech-act 
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is treated as an outcome of dialogue between persons.  Furthermore, the generative 
answerings and addressings must be located as if they are part of a polyphonic dialogue: 
 
Generative answerings 5: 
 Ethyl: The biggest problem for us is the sand, the dirt gets all over and breaks things. 
 Thando: It devalues our homes. 
 Lucy: Our homes, not the mayors! 
 James: I bet if there was one pot-hole in the street he stayed in it would be fixed just like 
that. 
 Gerald: It has been like this for over ten years, what difference does complaining about it 
now make? 
 Nonhlanhla: If we all complain they will have to listen, there are many of us and we matter. 
 Sibusiso: Especially if they are using our street as a bypass, our street! 
 
Generative addressings 5: 
 Suzanne: I feel better now that we have written to the press, at least something will be done. 
 Mike: That mayor had to be held accountable for the poor services we receive. 
 
Can you imagine it, group of rate-payers in a town-hall discussing the short-comings of the 
town council?  If the fact that a group of persons is cited as the author of this explicit speech-
act has nothing to do with polyphony, then why chose it to illustrate this analytic?  Firstly, to 
illustrate this distinction between group-author citation and polyphony.  Secondly, because 
persons are more accustomed to working with persons as agents with voices than any other 
intelligibility focus.  Prosaic intertexting argues that the focus could as meaningfully be 
shifted to a person-level author cited explicit speech-act having the multiple voices of „parts 
of self‟ populating the utterance – akin to the „internal discourse‟ of a person with multiple 
personality disorder.  The utterance rendering would look exactly the same (see Figure 21), 
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except for changes to (a) authorship in the explicit speech-act and (b) voice-identifiers in the 
answerings and addressings 
 
Figure 21. Feeling satisfied with ourselves/ourself. 
 
 
Imaginary exemplar 5: An explicit speech-act by Joe Bloggs 
“Please fix and tar our Suntown road | The residents of Suntown have been promised for 
more than 10 years an upgrade on dirt roads, street lighting and the cutting of grass. After 
numerous complaints by the residents about four years ago extensive drainage work was 
carried out. However the drainage system is now blocked because of a lack of maintenance. 
The road work has stopped. This potholed dirt road is destroying our cars and houses 
alongside the road are severely affected by dust. The road is also used as a bypass by 
hundreds of cars and trucks whenever the N3 freeway is blocked. Mr Sutcliffe, give this road 
a proper name because it is not on any Metro map and tar it so the ratepayers of Suntown can 
also applaud the work you do for residents in other areas. JOE BLOGGS – CONCERNED 
RATEPAYER, Suntown” 
 
Generative answerings 6 (compare with 5): 
 Fussy Joe: The biggest problem for us is the sand, the dirt gets all over and breaks things. 
 Avaricious Joe: It devalues our homes. 
 Spiteful Joe: Our homes, not the mayors! 
 Jealous Joe: I bet if there was one pot-hole in the street he stayed in it would be fixed just 
like that. 
 Morose Joe: It has been like this for over ten years, what difference does complaining about 
it now make? 
 Proud Joe: If we all complain they will have to listen, there are many of us and we matter. 
 Indignant Joe: Especially if they are using our street as a bypass, our street! 
 
Generative addressings 6 (compare with 5): 
 Nervy Joe: I feel better now that we have written to the press, at least something will be 
done. 
 Just Joe: That mayor had to be held accountable for the poor services we receive. 
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Again, „internal voices‟ is just an example of the possible intelligibility focus in polyphonic 
voicing.  In this dissertation academic disciplines and my person-level and interpersonal 
speaking-actings are given voice beside each other.  The choice of who/what to give and not 
give voice to is rhetorical and related to the author of the explicit speech-act only insofar as 
this relationship facilitates the rhetorical aims of the intelligibility rendering.   
 
Polyphony is a creative gift to the utterance, not a property of explicit speech-acts.  By 
assigning voice-identifiers (names) to answerings and addressings the utterance creator is 
given explicit control over the particular intelligibility they are rendering.  This is useful for 
social scientists as it provides a scrutinizable blue-print to consider who and what is included 
and excluded in the research rhetoric.  For example, often excluded voices are those of 
minority groups.  Polyphonic rendering also gives a person explicit control over the particular 
intelligibility of their self that they are rendering.  For example, a person may actively „shut 
out‟ the voice of an abusive parent when constructing the worth of their professional 
achievements.  Polyphony is illustrative, not diagnostic. 
 
Creating alternative intelligibility renderings. 
 
The spin-doctor: Sometimes there seems only one way for the explicit speech-act to make 
sense.  This is especially so when it is in explicit reply to a single speech-act.  This voice 
drowns out all others as the explicit author creates their interpretation as „the truth‟.  A 
particularly effective explicit author of this type has been social science and science in 
general.  This analytic is used to illustrate how prosaic intertexting may generate new 
meanings in a context of meaning-finalization.  This process is inherent in all meaning 
creating, and not limited to explicitly in-response speech-acts.  Rather, the model of prosaic 
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intertexting argues that all speech-acts must be „in-response‟ as an answering and an 
addressing; the example of in-response is chosen as illustrative merely because one level of 
in-responseness is already explicit. 
 
To begin, let me re-create the in-response letter as a prosaic intertexting utterance.  The letter 
which is responded to (see Exemplar 6) will be used as source material to create the a/a 
complex as well as answerings and addressings. 
 
Exemplar 6: An explicit speech-act on 15
th
 July 2008 
“De Villiers‟ critics silenced | We won at Carisbrook! What do the rugby scribes say now? 
Very few supported De Villiers and his game plan. Some were downright nasty, with only the 
odd person saying „give him a chance‟. One reporter even resorted to snide replies to anyone 
who dared say anything about his opinionated reporting. Now it will probably be Gold and 
Muir that did it. Or White‟s old game plan. They helped, sure. De Villiers, you beauty, may 
you coach for a long time. ANDREW VISAGIE, e-mail” 
 
Steven Steyn expends an entire article (see Exemplar 7) creating the a/a complex that Andrew 
Visagie‟s article be intelligible as un-related to reality, motivated by an over-eager desire to 
vindicate De Villiers as a coach and threaded with subversive racist tones.  Steven ignores 
Andrew‟ comments on the snide-ness of some reporters‟ accusations about De Villiers.  
Similarly, he brushes over Andrew‟s quip that even this „vindicative victory‟ will probably be 
put down to De Villier‟s assistants and not the man himself.  Instead Steven operates on the 
rhetoric that he is elucidating the „real‟ undertones to Andrew‟s article and showing this to be 
mis-informed and even malicious.  The primary success for Steven is that he is left the „final 
word‟ in the exchange.  He can dismiss Andrew‟s letter and re-create it as a misguided, over-





Exemplar 7: An explicit speech-act on 21
st
 July 2008 
“They won because they are Jake‟s team | I write in response to Andrew Visagie „We won‟ 
(July 15). The following players were Jake White‟s players inherited by De Villiers: Percy 
Montgomery, J P Pietersen, Brian Habana, Jean de Villiers, Franscois Steyn, Ruan Pienaar, 
Ricky January, Pierre Spies (although sick), Ryan Kankowski, Schalk Burger, Juan Smith, 
Victor Matfield, Bakkies Botha, CJ van der Linde, Guthro Steenkamp, John Smit, Bismark 
du Plessis. I might have left out a name, but tell me, with these players and five matches later 
what has De Villiers personally achieved? This is Jake White‟s squad and they played Jake‟s 
game plan this week. Last week when they played De Villiers‟s game plan they lost. When 
Dowd called him a puppet he (Dowd) was called a racist, but people did not mention Dowd is 
a Moari and therefore regarded as non-white. Oregon Hoskins called De Villiers a political 
appointment. He is also regarded as non-white so before everybody starts singing his praises, 
let‟s see what he can do. STEVEN STEYN, Durban North” 
 
Is this the final word though?  Can Steven‟s letter only be intelligible as a response rendered 
to Andrew‟s letter?  Steven creates a rhetoric in which his intelligibility rendering of 
Andrew‟s letter is the truth.  I will now create a rhetoric in which Steven‟s letter is not an act 
of truth statement, but rather an act of attempted stress-relief and self-affirmation.  I start this 
process by defining the a/a complex as follows: „How is Steven‟s explicit speech-act an 
expression of the writer‟s job related stress?  The a/a complex is coloured by an interest in 
thematic repetitions of job-failure excusing.  The explicit speech-act is treated as an episode 
in the writer‟s recurrent Freudian unconsciousness-struggle‟.  The resultant, coloured, 
utterance is graphically illustrated in Figure 22. 
 
Generative answerings 7: 
 Steven‟s id: Life should be enjoyable and creativity unpunished. 
 Steven‟s superego: You should feel ashamed at having underperformed at work, you are 
lazy and self-indulgent. 
 
Generative addressings 7: 
 Steven‟s ego: Everyone deserves a fair chance, but they should take care to make use of 
those chances that come their way. 
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By shifting the focus from Steven as an instance of race-obsession and overly optimistic 
about De Villiers as a coach (Steven‟s letter) to Steven as a person with internal struggles the 
explicit speech-act is rendered as an utterance with completely different meaning.  This 
analytic illustrates the process by which even seemingly finalized speech-acts can be re-
created as a new utterance.  This also illustrates the generative capacity of prosaic intertexting 
as a social science to re-negotiate and resolve both crises of meaning (as in narrative therapy 
– see pp. 27-28) and meaning disputes (as in mediation – see pp. 28-31). 
 
Creating meaning cohesion out of multiple voicers’ utterances. 
 
The opinion „poller‟: Often social science is intended to inform social policy outcomes.  A 
popular mechanism for weighing policy options is to weigh alternatives according to the level 
of support or prevalence of opinion or other summative measure of the positions of different 
persons.  However, prosaic intertexting argues that each person is completely unique, and 
each utterance is a once-off, living event.  How then can people share „the same‟ 
support/opinion/position.  One answer is that we, as social scientists, set a predefined 
parameter that creates when „similar‟ support/opinion/positions can be considered as „the 
same‟.  Prosaic intertexting argues that there is no inherent similarity even between two 
events.  Rather, this „similarity‟ is an act of active and rhetorical construction by the social 
scientist.  This analytic illustrates how prosaic intertexting as a model can be used to create 
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explicit cohesion out of multiple speech acts.  This process is illustrative of the operational 
mechanism of (1) consensus building, (2) structured surveying and (3) thematic generation. 
 
The social scientist is interested in „knowing‟ explicit speech-acts through a particular frame.  
It is expedient to define a single a/a complex and try to squeeze the explicit speech-acts into 
it.  This creates a number of utterances in parallel.  If the resultant utterances could be super-
imposed upon one another it would create a multi-dimensional utterance that is better 
reflective of the complexity of meaning creating than the simple illustrations in this thesis.  
The work in this analytic is to convince the reader that each explicit speech-act is just a 
particular instantiation of the created utterance; that the explicit speech-acts are the „same‟, 
just with different voicings.  This illusion is created by inventing answerings and addressings 
that are recognizably similar between the utterances created, but that illustrate how the „same‟ 
utterance has come to be explicitly spoken-acted in apparently different ways.  The first step 
in the intelligibility rendering is to define a focus through which multiple speech-acts can be 
created as utterance-siblings.  This a/a complex is necessarily broad, but also focussed on 
„categories‟: „What is the general response to the ANC policy of name changes for Durban 
streets? The analytic is coloured by an interest in creating a summative and unified set of 
discreet responses. The explicit speech-acts are treated as examples of public sentiment‟. 
 
Exemplar 8: An explicit speech-act on 3
rd
 June 2008 
“Council will reap the harvest it sows | Stubborn and adamant, the ANC-led council has 
decided to ignore all public opinion and objections and implement its street name changes, no 
matter how controversial some of these names are for the residents of the city. The once 
proud, racist Afrikaners did likewise, imposing their will on the people, naming towns and 
streets after their leaders and heroes. Communist Russia, too, went the same route; but now 
many of the hateful names of these repressive regimes have been expunged from the maps 
and political landscape and dumped into oblivion. The same fate awaits the council. Sutcliffe 
is a learned man and ought to know that ideologies come and go as frequently as fashion 
trends. And despots who ignore the will of the masses and trample on their rights will 
invariably meet an ignoble end. It would be a foolish councilor who does not heed the 
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concerns of the people. Andrew Zondo and Yasser Arafat roads will not be here forever; nor 
will Mike Sutcliffe and the ANC. I see graffiti artists being busy in the dark. T PILLAY, 
Silverglen” 
 
Exemplar 9: An explicit speech-act on 6
th
 June 2008 
“Is this how democracy works in SA? | Is this how democracy works? One person writes to 
the municipality and suggests many street name changes. Thousands write to the municipality 
objecting to certain of these changes. The municipality ignores all these objections and goes 
ahead with the changes. Is this democracy ANC style? A STRONG, Durban North” 
 
These two utterances-in-potentia („Exemplars 8 and 9) need to be „melded‟ together.  This 
melding is graphically represented in Figure 23. 
 




In order to achieve this melding the social scientist must generate answerings and addressings 
that could be tacked onto either explicit speech-act.  Figure 24 graphically illustrates one way 
of tacking generative answerings 8 and generative addressings 8 onto the „melded‟ speech-
act. 
 
Generative answerings 8: 
 Modern rhetoritician: People use examples to achieve rhetorical goals. 
 Emotions theorist: Explicit objections are representative of tacit concerns. 
 Conflict resolution expert: Arguments between two parties are often laden with latent 
threats against each other. 
 Support group coordinator: Exasperation is an expression of fear and lack of hope for a 
positive resolution. 
 Discourse analyst: Perfect exemplars and imperfect archetypes punctuate rhetoric as final 
arbiters of truth. 
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Generative addressings 8: 
 Policy advisor: People generally object to the proposed name changes, though their reasons 
differ. 
 Daily News reader: No matter the number and scope of our objections the ANC simply will 
not pay attention to our objections. 
 Sceptic: Even a majority voice has no impact in this country. 
 Opposition politician: The people of Durban are united in opposition to the proposed name 
changes, their sentiment is unanimous. 
 




Without generating answerings for the explicit speech-act on June 3
rd
 or addressings for the 
explicit speech-act on June 6
th
 the invented-as-melded speech-act is created as an utterance.  
These other answerings and addressings are possible-to-create, but I leave them out to 
illustrate how two explicit speech-acts can be forced together.  The generative answerings (8) 
and addressings (8) are explicitly stated as inter-changeable between the two original explicit 
speech-acts.  This interchange-ability is illustrated in Figure 25, which is simply a mirror-
image of Figure 24. 
 




Meaning cohesion is an act of the social scientist.  The process of generating meaning 
cohesion is twofold.  Firstly, an „explicit speech-act‟-inclusive (through which multiple data 
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can be created as meaningful) a/a complex must be stated.  Secondly, „explicit speech-act‟-
interchangeable answerings and addressings must be generated.  This process is implicitly 
followed in summative social science such as opinion surveys.  Habermas‟ „communicative 
rationality‟ (see Habermas, 1984; 1992) and Gadamer‟s „intersubjective agreement‟ (see 
Gadamer, 1997) are attempts to solve the problem of meaning equivalence between discreet 
subject positions.  Prosaic intertexting offers a tool to explicate (and open to scrutiny) this 
process.  Also explicated in prosaic intertexting is what is „lost‟ in summing more than one 
explicit speech-act as instances of a single utterance.  Each tree is inevitably twisted and 
distorted in the process.  There is no space for either/any explicit speech-act to be an 
utterance or call its own (independent) answerings and addressings.  The social scientist has 
created a new, melded-together explicit speech-act that is qualitatively different from its 
ostensible „component parts‟.  The cost of any nomothetic multi-„explicit speech-act‟ 
utterance generation is the idiopathics of the original explicit speech-acts. 
 
Creating meaning cohesion out of a voicer’s seriated utterances. 
 
The personality theorist: The creation of multiple speech-acts as a single utterance is similar 
(at least I am constructing it as similar) to the creation of single „self‟ for the person.  This 
aspect of prosaic intertexting is fundamental to human be-ing as it is equivalent to the time-
extended creation of an „I‟-position.  We give the „I‟-positions names (Thando, Jessi or 
Lesley) and label their agency accordingly.  In lay speak explicit speech-acts made by the 
person are created as indicative of their underlying „self‟.  Prosaic intertexting argues that 
there is no necessary link between individual utterance events (including things like „selfs‟).  
Rather, the self must be created as an utterance.  This analytic illustrates how the „self‟, a 
continued identity of the person as an explicit speaker-actor, is a rhetorical tool to achieve a 
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particular intelligibility rendering.  Selfs are useful rhetorical elements in meaning making.  
Linking multiple explicit speech-acts is greatly simplified if they are conveniently spoken-
acted by the „same‟ person.  The person is a generically whole utterance.  Therefore the work 
of intelligibility rendering is simplified to explicating the idiosyncrasies of this person – who 
can be taken for granted to be intelligible.   
 
This analytic will illustrate the process of creating the self-as-utterance.  In order to do so the 
a/a complex must be defined by an interest in self-creation: „What is Vijay Ismail‟s motive to 
write multiple letters to the editor of the Daily News? The analytic is coloured by an interest 
in elucidating the personality of Vijay Ismail. The explicit speech-acts are treated as 
imperfect instantiations of this personality‟.  After stating an interest in the „self‟ that is 
responsible for particular speech-acts (or rather in creating a self as if it were coherently 
responsible for multiple speech-acts) the social scientist then collects data sources in order to 
substantiate their claim of this „self‟.  In this case I illustrate the process with three data from 
the persons to be created as a single self (Exemplars 10, 11 and 12). 
 
Exemplar 10: An explicit speech-act on 3
rd
 July 2008 
“Nqakula has failed against crime | The general crime level in South Africa, according to the 
April 2007-March 2008 crime statistics, is still very high. There is nothing to crow about with 
this unacceptable level. It is such a shame to see the conviction rate so low, while crime is 
high. South Africa is a crime-ridden country. This boils down to the fact that safety and 
security minister Charles Nqakula is a definite failure. He has failed to take effective action to 
bring down crime, therefore, it should be asked whether it is not time to replace him. VIJAY 
ISMAIL, Umzinto” 
 
Exemplar 11: An explicit speech-act on 14
th
 July 2008 
“Logie‟s red light farce | I am dismayed and disappointed at deputy mayor Logie Naido and 
the idea of the eThekwini Municipality creating red light districts where prostitution and 
other business in the sex industry will operate. He said that the council would make sure the 
red light districts were established as soon as possible instead of speaking out against them. 
Would Naidoo and other eThekwini councilors approve of their daughters and wives entering 
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the red light industry? This is my question to them. In the name of morality and strong 
religious and family values Naidoo should realize it‟s not a good idea to encourage the sex 
industry. We already have enough immorality in our country and now the eThekwini council 
wants to promote the sex industry, thus encouraging promiscuity and opening the way for 
immorality. Legalising the sex industry should be condemned outright. The council should 
think wisely as man should not go against what our religions teach us. VIJAY ISMAIL, 
Umzinto” 
 
Exemplar 12: An explicit speech-act on 23
rd
 July 2008 
“Premier wakes up at last | It is interesting to note that the KwaZulu-Natal Premier S‟bu 
Ndebele expressed concern at the poor service the public was receiving from the Department 
of Home Affairs in Durban. Why is the premier concerned? What he witnessed is nothing 
new. The public has been complaining about unacceptably poor service for a long time. The 
staff appear to be fooling around at many of the home affairs departments, but public 
complaints have simply been ignored, at least until now that the premier has seen it for 
himself. Service is poor at many government departments. Staff are busy on cell-phones, 
talking to their friends or fooling around, while ignoring the public. It is high time the 
government pulled up its socks in these departments. VIJAY ISMAIL, Umzinto” 
 
How can these three explicit speech-acts be representative of the same self?  Imaging that 
each of the explicit speech-acts can be graphically represented as a different shade of grey for 
the vertical line (as on p. 2), then they might be illustrated together as if they are 
representative of one self as in Figure 26.  One reason for shading in grey to differentiate 
between the explicit speech-acts.  The other reason to illustrate that all of the explicit speech-
acts are imperfect approximations of the invented speech-act that the social scientist creates 
an utterance is created around.  The answer to the question at the beginning of this paragraph 
is: if the social scientist creates an utterance where the three explicit speech-acts are treated 
as if they are representative of one self.   
 





The subsequent processes of prosaic intertexting continue as if this invented speech-act is not 
different from any explicit speech-act.  In prosaic intertexting theory there is no difference 
between the two.  The resultant utterance is represented graphically in Figure 27. 
 
Generative answerings 9: 
 Vijay‟s father: Vijay, a person should never be afraid to voice their opinion. 
 Vijay‟s friend: Who cares Vijay, stop talking! 
 Vijay: I am worthy and can help the world. 
 Vijay: Don‟t ignore me. 
 
Generative addressings 9: 
 Vijay: My opinion is out there, I am helping the world. 
 Vijay‟s mother: I am proud of you my child. 
 Vijay‟s neighbour: Wow, this Vijay knows what he is talking about. 
 Vijay: And that is why, politics 101 class, the ANC is missing the proverbial boat. 
 Random lady: Aren‟t you the guy from the newspaper? 
 




And there you have it; a person-utterance with childhood memories and ambitions of social 
recognition and love.  The explicit speech-acts are attention-seeking and self-image anxiety 
motivated pleas for recognition.  The explicit speech-acts are one utterance.  Their oneness is 
personal, self-ish.  Three explicit speech-acts are squeezed together as if they are one.  A 




Prosaic intertexting is what we do when we think of our selfs or of other persons.  To be in an 
instant is to be created as a living-in-the-moment utterance.  This analytic illustrates a tool for 
persons to re-create their „selfs‟ by examining what they are cramming into the answerability 
complex.  By making what is oft-implicit explicit the person has the rhetorical power to 
change the way they continue to invent utterances-of-self.  Identity is an act of 
focus/„perspective‟ and deciding what to include and exclude as part of the self.  For 
example, Vijay may exclude the fourth-listed addressing, re-creating his self as not ambitious 
of academia.  Or Vijay may include an extra answering „Vijay‟s bad primary-school teacher: 
You need to speak up or no one will notice and you will amount to nothing‟, so that he might 
continue a narrative in which he no longer feels the need to write letters to the editor and has 
overcome a teacher‟s wrongful influence.  „Self‟ creating in prosaic intertexting is a special 
case of identity/equivalence creating (as illustrated in the analytic above).  While the task is 
more natural (it is the mechanism of be-ing), the diction is also more calcified by the strong 
centripetal pull to be clearly and unambiguously defined as a person. 
 
Creating meaning in the context of ventriloque. 
 
The rhetoritician: A quote is never pointless, all quotes are rhetorical tools.  In prosaic 
intertexting addressings and answerings are all fictive quotes of imaginary voices.  In prosaic 
intertexting the invented quotes are ventriloques of imaginary speech languages.  But, in the 
rhetoric of an explicit speech-act the ventriloque is not of the quoted „author‟.  Rather, 
quoting in explicit speech-acts ventriloques that logical maxim that (i) what is explicitly 
stated by one has a meaning and (ii) that the stater can be held to that meaning.  Quoting is an 
act of finalization.  A person cannot repeat the words of another without making rhetorical 
use of them and re-creating the words as a new utterance.  Prosaic intertexting holds that 
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there is one moment of living for each utterance, and this moment cannot be repeated.  This 
analytic illustrates the power of editing, of adding qualifications or even just answering the 
addressing of an utterance with another.  While no meaning (in the abstract, continued, 
contested sense) is ever final, ventriloque of logical/social maxims, such as the one stated 
above, are strong rhetorical tools in finalizing a meaning. 
 
Adding qualifications to a quote of an explicit speech-act is equivalent to creating an a/a 
complex through which it is rendered intelligible.  The author of the utterance is not the 
quoted person, but rather the quoting, qualifying person.  If Exemplar 13 is rendered as a 
whole, Enver Mall is completely mute, their voice substituted by the Editor‟s rhetoric serving 
caricature.   
 
Exemplar 13: An explicit speech-act on 20
th
 June 2008 
“Old Daily News not so brave | While the Daily News’s „brave editors and journalists‟ of the 
1980s, as they are called in your 130
th
 birthday editorial of June 4, were allegedly attempting 
to be guided by the principles of press freedom to „bring to readers as much truth as could be 
gleaned‟, the Daily News was guilty of deliberately ignoring, avoiding or minimizing sport 
coverage of those sporting institutions, such as the South African Council on Sport (Sacos) 
and its affiliates, that were at the forefront of the anti-apartheid sports struggle. I write from 
personal experience. From 1980 to 1990, I played more than 40 first-class cricket matches for 
Natal under the auspices of the Natal Cricket Board (NCB). During this decade, the Daily 
News carried the grand total of one match report of a first-class cricket match played by the 
NCB team. This was the Natal versus Western Province match at Siripat Road in March 
1982. This decade also coincided with the various apartheid government sponsored rebel 
cricket and rugby tours which enjoyed major unapologetic coverage by the Daily News. Other 
non-racial anti-apartheid sports codes also had similar experiences of being deliberately 
ignored by the Daily News during the 1980s. During this time, however, white sport 
continued to flourish, thanks in part to the extensive coverage they enjoyed through the white 
press, of which the Daily News in this province was a leading player. COTTONTAIL, 
Durban 
 
The point made by the reader is not under dispute. It has been accepted in most quarters that 
coverage of instiutions like Sacos in the period in question did not do justice to the courage 
and commitment of those involved in its cause. To put matters in perspective, the whole issue 
of media coverage from 1960 to 1993 came under intense scrutiny when editors gave detailed 
and candid evidence of their experiences in the TRC probe into media in the 1990s. Among 
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those who volunteered evidence were many „brave journalists and editors‟ whose 
contributions are well documented in the final TRC media report. EDITOR” 
 
The Editor creates an a/a complex for Cottontail‟s original explicit speech-act.  Let me now 
populate this answerability complex with answerings and addressings.  In doing so I will 
attempt the ventriloque the Editor such that I might hold to the words they have spoken and 
myself use the rhetorical power of „quoting‟.  In the Editor‟s creation of an utterance there is 
no explicit statement of the a/a complex.  Rather, the a/a complex is defined by the 
addressings and answerings that populate it. 
 
Generative answerings 10: 
 Daily News policy: All accusations against the Daily News must be responded to with 
clarity and equanimity. 
 Freedom of speech legislature: Everyone is entitled to their opinion, but this opinion not 
necessarily to be adhered to by others. 
 TRC probe into media: Daily News reporters were very cooperative with our investigations. 
 Most quarters: Media did not give enough support and coverage to organizations such as 
Sacos. 
 
Generative addressing 10: 
 The Editor: Credit should be given where credit is due. 
 
In this analytic I have quoted the Editor in generating answerings and an addressing.  I 
ventriloque the maxim that each explicit speech-act has a meaning and its author can be held 
to this meaning.  The utterance created is my utterance, not the Editor‟s, just as the letter to 
the editor is the Editors, not Cottontail‟s.  My utterance has the following definition of the a/a 
complex: „How can I illustrate the use of quotes as rhetorical devices using direct quotes and 
ventriloque? The analytic is coloured by an interest in the authorship of (a) explicit speech-
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acts, and (b) utterances. The explicit speech-act is treated as an exemplar of quoting and 
ventriloque in rhetoric.  The resultant utterance is graphically illustrated in Figure 28.  
 




This analytic has been an explication of the rhetorical use of (1) quoting and (2) ventriloque.  
In prosaic intertexting the person quoting is considered the utterance-author of the quote.  In 
creating an utterance for social scientific enquiry the social scientist must take authorship – 
this is in opposition to Hirsch‟s idea that meaning is hidden in the text (see Hirsch, 1960; 
1967; 1976).  The use of data to support the social scientific rhetoric is an act of false 
ventriloque.  The data‟s „voice‟ is not being accessed.  Rather, the social scientific maxim 
that data has meaning and that meaning can be validly re-presented by the social scientist. 
 
Creating a narrative for a hiding author. 
 
The story-teller: That an utterance is a whole is all well and good, but sometimes what is 
more interesting is a story or narrative.  Prosaic intertexting lays the foundation of unit-pieces 
through which narratives can be constructed, but how does this work?  By choosing an 
explicit speech-act where the author is consciously anonymous I have lee-way to use a 
mysterious author-identity to create the narrative.  This is not a reflection of when and when 
not such narratives can be created.  Rather, it is an interesting „in‟.  What constitutes a 
narrative is a matter for rhetorical debate, I argue here that in prosaic intertexting any more 
than one utterance, created as a seriated story, comprises a narrative.  For illustrative 
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purposes I will use three utterances, one derived from an explicit speech act (Exemplar 14) 
and two derived from invented speech-acts (Exemplars 15 and 16).  Each utterance rendering 
has the same a/a complex in order to facilitate seriating: „How can Sad Sack‟s story be told? 
The analytic is coloured by an interest in the precursors and consequences of this letter-
written part of Sad Sack‟s story. The explicit speech-act is treated as just one part of a 
continuing narrative‟. 
 
Exemplar 14: An explicit speech-act on 7
th
 July 2008 
“Judge Mbeki by his friends | I must compliment Max du Preez (July 3, 2008) but add one 
more thing … a man can be judged by the company he keeps – Jackie Selebi, President 
Robert Mugabe, President Thabo Mbeki – and a man‟s deeds will indeed be the judge of him. 
Mbeki has brought disgrace to the very notion of democracy in Africa and to all the people of 
Zimbabwe who tried in March to exercise their right to vote. He is a disgrace to the office of 
the president as he has no intention to uphold our constitution nor any of its values, which he 
promised to uphold when sworn in as president. If it were otherwise, he would have dealt 
with Mugabe differently – he has become a nobody who has forgotten his own roots and what 
the very struggle that put him in power was for. SAD SACK, e-mail” 
 
Generative answerings 11: 
 Hopeful Sad Sack: If I write a letter to the press I can be recognized for having brought real 
change to the world, people will listen. 
 Sagely Sad Sack: We are all our sister/brother‟s keepers; it is each of our duty to act when 
we see another straying from the path of good. 
 Bitter Sad Sack: I never got what I hoped for after I voted for the ANC, they owe me, but I 
do not expect to collect. 
 Affable Sad Sack: What do you lot think of this Mbeki character hey, what a joke hey, I bet 
if I write a letter to the Daily News slating him it‟ll go unpunished, ought to get a few laughs 
at least. 
 
Generative addressings 11: 
 Dubious Sad Sack: Even deriding him makes no difference, the ANC still carry on as if 
there is no change. 
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 Unequivocal Sad Sack: That is why it is said „power corrupts‟, it takes corruption to get into 
power in the first place. 
 Irritable Sad Sack: Yes, yes we know he is useless, so what, get on with it. 
 Dreamer Sad Sack: I‟m important, my boss read the letter and she things I have some 
interesting thoughts on politics. 
 
Each answering and each addressing is a speech-act in potential.  Figure 29 graphically 
illustrates my choice of two generatives to show how utterances link to create narratives.  
Both of the chosen generatives are thick lines in Figure 29 in order to illustrate their changing 
status from generatives to speech-acts. 
 




Invented Exemplar 15: 
“We are all our sister/brother‟s keepers, it is each of our duty to act when we see another 
straying from the path of good. Sagely Sad Sack” 
 
Generative answerings 12: 
 Sad Sack‟s friend: Have you heard the latest on Mbeki, what a waste of a vote that one. 
 Sad Sack‟s partner: Don‟t knock the guy, it is not our place to judge. 
 Angry Sad Sack: I wouldn‟t be down where I am if it weren‟t for corrupt politicians like 
Mbeki. 
 
The utterance invented around Exemplar 15 is graphically illustrated in Figure 30.  The 
dotted lines are the lines from Figure 29, showing the new utterance‟s relative position to the 
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utterance created around Exemplar 14.  Exemplar 15 and generative answerings 12 are 
illustrated as solid lines. 
 




Invented Exemplar 16: 
“I‟m important, my boss read the letter and she thinks I have some interesting thoughts on 
politicts. Dreamer Sad Sack” 
 
Generative addressings 13: 
 Sad Sack‟s partner: You got a raise? That is fantastic, ooh, I love you so much! 
 Sad Sack‟s colleague: Look who‟s moving up in the world? 
 Pessimist Sad Sack: Faker. 
 
The utterance invented around Exemplar 16 is graphically illustrated in Figure 31.  The 
dotted lines are the lines from Figures 29 and 30, showing the new utterance‟s relative 
position to the utterance created around Exemplars 14 and 15.  Exemplar 16 and generative 
addressings 13 are illustrated as solid lines. 
 







The creation of one narrative silences the voicing of other possible narratives.  Narrative 
creation is an act of finalization.  Utterances can be strung together by imposing one as a 
member of the other‟s answerability complex, but this stringing takes rhetorical effort.  
Prosaic intertexting is a tool for utterance generation and this opens the space for narrative 
creating.  However, narratives, like utterances, are only living in the moment of their be-ing 
as an uttered utterance string.  Persons be in the moment-by-moment co-authored and co-
dependent creation of a seriated story of „I‟.   
 
The nine analytics in this chapter have served as exemplars of the functioning of prosaic 
intertexting as a model of the utterance.  The model substantiates that (1) person acts can be 
re-created as utterances with this model, (2) person-acts are infinitely divisible and these 
divisions can also be re-created as utterances using this model, (3) the positioning of 
addressees (and answerblees) is an efficacious means of creating meaning, (4) utterance 
creation is done in the context of polyphonic and contesting possibilities, (5) meaning is 
unfinal and can be re-created, (6) data from different voicers can be re-created as if 
representative of a singular voice, (7) the „self‟ is re-created as an utterance by considering 
disparate speech-acts as self-representative, (8) ventriloque is an effective rhetorical force in 










Chapter 5: A re-cap to invoke answerability in future utterances 
 
This chapter is an opportunity to discuss both the limitations and the implications of my 
dissertation.  I divide this task into three sections (limitations, a reflection on the model itself, 
and a discussion of possible implications), to follow.  At the outset though: no meaning is 
final, nor can meaning be created by a person alone.  Rather, I have proposed meaning in this 
dissertation and it is up to the reader to consummate this meaning in the most productive 
way.   
 
The dissertation is clearly limited by the assumptions made at its outset.  These assumptions 
are not, and could not be, justified adequately in the dissertation of limited length.  However, 
it remains an important limitation as the model of prosaic intertexting is only an answer to 
this particular set of assumptions addressings.  If any of the assumptions are invalidated then 
prosaic intertexting itself is no longer meaningful.  Also, even if the assumptions are not 
invalidated but only questioned by the reader, the dissertation may be unable to talk with, not 
past, the reader.  Additionally, the assumptions made (and even more so the assumptions 
made together) could be far from what conventional social science is accustomed to.  An 
attempted remedy to this was the time spent in a section of chapter 3 to explicitly enumerate 
these assumptions, but they were not substantially proved. 
 
A further limitation of the dissertation is inherent in the philosophy of prosaic intertexting.  
The creation of an utterance (in this case the dissertation) involves a choice of what is 
included as a referent (generative answering/addressing).  This choice is influenced by an 
imperative to only present those referents that positively define the utterance.  The 
dissertation may appear (on the whole and in sections) not to include the necessary 
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referencing that is conventional in social science.  I have already included a disclaimer about 
this (see p. 1), but it is a limitation on the scope and validity of the dissertation.  I also argue 
that while there are rich and diverse intellectual traditions around the ontology and 
epistemology of social science and the issues raised in this dissertation, there remains a lack 
of micro-level methodological tools that embody the implications of these traditions.  I hope 
that prosaic intertexting fills this gap and is therefore excused for what is acknowledged to be 
a contentious implication for social science (that referencing is conventionally too effusive). 
 
The data used to demonstrate the model in chapter 4 is also only data of one type.  The grand 
claim by prosaic intertexting is that it can be used to analyze any person-act; that explicit 
speech-acts are defined by their variety of possible incarnations.  The data in the dissertation 
does not satisfy this.  It remains a task for future research to establish the implementation of 
prosaic intertexting with other sorts of data.  Particularly important in this further research is 
to concentrate on data forms that conventional social science has less ability to authoritatively 
analyze, for example non-verbal communication. 
 
A formatting limitation of the dissertation is the trade-off between length and scope in a 
masters-level work.  The dissertation exceeds the conventional page length for a dissertation 
at this level (though I think that some of this is mitigated by the extensive use of in-text 
figures that must be included in the body and not as appendixes in order to preserve the flow 
of the dissertation).  At the same time it is rather narrow in scope (concentrating solely on 
prosaic intertexting as a legitimate and practical research tool and affording only cursory 
looks at both the multiple genesis and actualization points for the ideas).  This is a problem 
insofar as the dissertation is measured according to conventional social science norms.  Such 
norms are necessary to assess the relative worth of this dissertation over others.  So the thesis 
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is in the double-bind of preaching how social science should be done and actually doing 
social science (more on how the dissertation structure reflects the thesis‟ claims for social 
science below).  I believe I have achieved an adequate compromise in this regard. 
 
In Chapter 1 I presented an outline of the dissertation through the prosaic intertexting model 
(see p. 5).  To reiterate, this dissertation is something different, the name changes and 
changes to the structure of the thesis are not aesthetic.  Chapter 1 defines the a/a complex, 
Chapter 2 is the explicit speech-act that I try to render intelligible, Chapter 3 are generative 
answerings, Chapter 4 are generative addressings.   
 
Structuring the dissertation in accordance with the ideas of social science is the biggest point 
of compromise in the dissertation.  This must be both accessible and different.  The model 
serves as a platform, it is incompletely conceptualized, unfinal in its possibilities. There are 
three key elements that define the model (the explicit-speech act, the a/a complex, and the 
generatives).  By way of discussion I reflect on the relative success of each of these points to 
create a meaning for prosaic intertexting as I wish it to be. 
 
It is necessary to re-conceive the nature of what is available to conventional social science.  
This is a philosophical assumption of the thesis.  But if „data‟ is to be re-conceived, then what 
is it to be conceived as?  Explicit speech-acts are an attempt to solve this problem.  But 
explicit speech-acts are a lie.  Nothing, not even explicit speech-acts can exist independently 
of a meaning (and therefore utterance) because the first thing a person does when 
experiencing something is to try and make sense of it.  Indeed personhood can be defined by 
a stream of experiences.  In this way the notion of an explicit speech-act fails miserably.  
Furthermore, labelling them speech-acts may trigger too many conventional notions of data 
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being verbal/linguistic and not embodied.  The redeeming quality of explicit speech-acts is 
that they force the social scientist to state what they are drawing conclusions about.  The 
social scientist must be specific in identifying what they wish to re-create as meaningful.  
This though is not really a new feature of prosaic intertexting, it is a requirement of all 
rigorous social science. 
 
Explicitly stating the a/a complex is, to a differing degree, also an established part of social 
science methodology.  This though, in conventional social science, has concentrated on the 
theoretical and research question that the social scientist is using to interrogate the data.  
Rather, it should be an explicit statement of the social scientist‟s motive/rhetoric/interest in 
interrogating the data as they intend to.  This is an important addition, though I do not think 
the model as created in this dissertation adequately captures the necessity of stating the social 
scientist‟s agenda.  This is balanced by the social scientist not being the sole meaning creator.  
Rather, the reader too has responsibility to state their intentions in consummating a particular 
meaning-as-made. 
 
The generatives are possibly the most controversial elements of the prosaic intertexting 
model.  It directly contravenes science logic that in order to „understand‟ something we must 
add to that something.  However, the generatives afford the social scientist space in which to 
explicate how they are „understanding‟ something as they are, not simply what the data 
should be „understood‟ as.  This adds greater scope for critical social science to interrogate 
the meaning-creation and in this sense adds to the rigour of social scientific analysis.  The 
method for generating answerings and addressings is poorly outlined in the dissertation 
though.  It is assumed that the social scientist can „be creative‟ in doing so.  This is a definite 
area for further research. 
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A key area for future research into this model of the utterance is exploring its ethical 
implications.  Bakhtin (1990a; 1993) and Brown, Tappan and Gilligan (1995) have provided 
strong ethical arguments around the inherent responsibility people have toward each other in 
creating meaning together and the relative power of inter-subjectivity.  Prosaic intertexting, 
as a methodological model for social science, carries concrete implications for the social 
scientist as responsible for the consummation of a research participant‟s utterance.  
Furthermore, it provides a model to investigate the operation of this power on a micro-level 
by making explicit the process of voice-contestation in the a/a complex and its consequences 
for the meaning outcome. 
 
Related to this it is important to further consider the „responsibility‟ implications of self-as-
an-utterance.  Since the utterance is unfinal, so is the self.  So who is responsible for the self 
as actualized?  Some responsibility must be with the people-who-consummate meanings 
which has implications for the assignation of blame and guilt.  Also in this line is to consider 
a person‟s responsibility to re-create their reality and not be a victim of the continued „stasis 
quo‟.  If people are agents and nothing is definite then there is a profound responsibility on 
persons to define well.  The model of prosaic intertexting presented here offers a mechanism 
by which persons can undertake this responsibility.  Further research should investigate the 
viability of using this model in a therapeutic or counselling context, as well as in „peace-
building‟ or mediation efforts. 
 
Future research should also investigate the implications of prosaic intertexting as a model of 
teaching and learning and group change through inter-personal meaning creating.  If it is 
assumed that any given „fact‟ – and this fact is treated as an explicit speech-act – can be 
created as being sensible, then prosaic intertexting offers a model of how this thing can be 
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created to „make sense‟ between people.  This is useful in both the formal education 
environment and the informal „learning‟ of a solution for two reasons.  Firstly, it requires that 
people create a common ground on which they can co-create and is therefore facilitative of 
communication.  Secondly, it encourages participants to think critically about not just the 
„fact‟, but also the process by which they create its meaning; this criticalness is important for 
both the validity and the ethicality of the meaning. 
 
Since this dissertation has posited prosaic intertexting as a social scientific methodology its 
key implication must be on what this „method‟ allows social science to do.  In this regard the 
model both inspires further research (see above) and is a working method for conducting 
analysis.  At the heart of this is that this dissertation is a statement of how, not of what social 
science should do.  The dissertation posits prosaic intertexting as an opportunity, the 
implications that flow from this are in many ways determined by the reader.  I outlined three 
specific research problems for this dissertation in chapter 1.  Firstly, can a model of the 
utterance with ontologically relativist assumptions, have face validity?  Secondly, does this 
model of the utterance also accurately model the self-in-be-ing as it should in theory?  
Thirdly, is this model of self applicable in such a way that it adds value and possibilities to 
social science?  The first two questions are impossible for me to answer, I clearly must 
assume they are both affirmative.  The third question can only be answered with a „no‟.  The 
model itself cannot add value to social science, it means nothing.  Rather, we are faced with 
the open question of „will the model add value to social science?‟, and we are the addressees 
in this instance. 
 
This dissertation has not been a neutral discussion, nor a systematic collection of facts, but a 
story.  And, it is a story that argues that all social science is actually „story-telling‟.  At least 
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this story lays bare its „author‟s notes‟, its doubts and assumptions of faith.  Prosaic 
intertexting is a thinking tool to express rigour and accountability in social science, it models 
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